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I. INTRODUCTION 
The introduction in patent statutes of a requirement to disclose the 
origin of genetic resources and prior informed consent of the use of 
traditional knowledge in claimed inventions (hereinafter “the 
Requirement”) has been at the center of an international debate for 
the last few years. Many developing, biodiversity-rich countries 
consider that the Requirement is an essential component of a broader 
approach to patent law, which should be informed by considerations 
of economic development.1 At the other end of the spectrum, a few 
industrialized countries believe that the Requirement is not only 
incompatible with current international law, in particular the TRIPS 
Agreement,2 but that it also undermines the value of patents as titles 
that secure private property rights because it unnecessarily 
 1. See Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda 
for WIPO, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004). That proposal has received the support 
of the delegations of South Africa, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Iran, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Tanzania 
and Venezuela. See also Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a 
Development Agenda for WIPO. WIPO Doc. WO/GA/31/13 (Sept. 27, 2004); Proposal by 
Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, WIPO Doc. 
WO/GA/31/14 (Sept. 28, 2004). All WIPO treaties and documents cited in this Article are 
available on the WIPO’s website, at http://www.wipo.int. See infra Part III.F for a brief report 
of ongoing multilateral discussions. 
 2. See infra notes 38 and 53 and accompanying text. 
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complicates the already complex patent procurement procedures and 
reduces legal certainty.3 
Actually, the debate on the Requirement has caused international 
discussions on the advancement of standards of patentability to stall,4 
 3. See Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty, WIPO Doc. 
PCT/R/WG/6/12 (May 7, 2004). The United States delegation said that the Swiss proposal to 
include a provision in the PCT Regulations allowing PCT Parties to adopt the Requirement 
would not achieve its stated goals of achieving timely solutions to access to genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge as well as the sharing of the benefits derived from 
such access. Rather, the proposal would sanction provisions in national laws to deny 
patent rights and challenge granted patents under prescribed circumstances, which 
would increase litigation, create a disincentive for innovation, and reduce any benefits 
that may be shared. The Delegation could thus not support the proposal . . . . The 
Delegation of the United States of America noted that Switzerland compared its 
proposal to disclosure requirements which were based upon fundamental principles of 
patent law or required as a practical matter to facilitate patent examination, but in the 
Delegation’s view the disclosure requirement proposed by Switzerland was directed to 
matters falling outside patent laws such as access and benefit sharing. The Delegation 
expressed the view that patent laws were not the appropriate means for addressing 
matters of misappropriation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, or other 
matters of general misconduct. Such thinking might lead States to attempt to advance 
other non-patent related goals, such as a tax reporting requirement, through the patent 
laws. 
Id. at 17. Nevertheless, the United States has its own statutory provisions with a disclosure 
requirement that advances non-patent goals. In contrast with the Swiss proposal, however, the 
U.S. statutory provisions are consistent with international law because they are dictated by 
concerns over material (or proprietary) interests in the patents. See infra Part IV.D. 
 4.  
Although the work of the SCP [WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents] has 
produced some useful results, the lack of progress at recent SCP sessions clearly 
demonstrates that the current model for discussion is not workable. Indeed, discussions 
in the SCP have degenerated to the point that the SCP was unable to agree to a further 
work program at its most recent session of May 10–14, 2004. There are several 
reasons for this lack of progress . . . . Beyond this, the draft treaty documents contain 
several provisions that have been extremely controversial and of a high political 
sensitivity, leading to postponement of discussions on some provisions and protracted 
debates with little resulting progress on others. 
Proposal by the United States of America and Japan for Establishing a New Work Plan for the 
Standing Committee on the Law of Patents (SCP), WIPO Doc. WO/GA/31/10 (Aug. 27, 2004). 
That proposal was submitted to the WIPO 31st Ordinary (15th Extraordinary) General 
Assembly, of 2004. As described infra, in Part III.F, the United States and Japan have 
attempted to insulate the current work of the SCP on a draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty 
(SPLT) by separating topics that are of a more technical nature (such as novelty and 
inventiveness, or non-obviousness) from the debate of the adoption of the Requirement. That 
attempt, as noted infra, even if correct from a technical point of view, has not been successful in 
the SCP. The major concern of developing countries is, naturally, an eventual TRIPS 
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to the prejudice of the interests of inventors and the society at large in 
obtaining titles that are more secure and less prone to challenges, thus 
increasing legal security of intangible assets. An objective 
clarification of the legal aspects of the Requirement, therefore, has 
become a matter of urgency. That is what this Article intends to 
achieve. This Article has two main objectives: to explain that the 
Requirement, as a condition of patentability aimed at monitoring the 
implementation of the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD),5 is 
incompatible with current international law, including the CBD itself; 
and to discuss possible ways of adopting the Requirement that are 
compatible with international law. 
Part II of this Article describes the main objectives that 
biodiversity-rich developing countries want to achieve by adopting 
the Requirement. It also explains the formal nature of the 
Requirement—several international treaties against which the 
Requirement is to be checked treat formal and substantive 
requirements differently. 
Part III assesses the inconsistency of the Requirement vis-à-vis the 
relevant international instruments, namely the TRIPS Agreement,6 
the UPOV Convention(s),7 the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT),8 the 
inconsistency of the Requirement, for it might lead to disputes under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism and, ultimately, the risk of commercial sanctions. Developing countries 
expect that, if they were able to include language in support of their view in the SPLT, they 
would be closer to a consensus on the adoption of the Requirement in the WTO framework. 
 5. The Convention on Biological Diversity, Dec. 29, 1993, available at 
http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp [hereinafter CBD]. Currently, the CBD has 188 
parties. The text of the Treaty as well as an introductory guide to its provisions can be found on 
the CBD Secretariat’s website, at http://www.biodiv.org. 
 6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), Annex 1C, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter 
the TRIPS Agreement, or, simply TRIPS]. The text of the TRIPS Agreement as well as of the 
WTO documents cited in this Article are available on the WTO website, at http://www.wto.org. 
 7. “UPOV” is the acronym of the Union pour la Protection des Obtentions Végétales. 
Two different versions of the UPOV Convention of 1961 are in force: UPOV 1978 and UPOV 
1991. The texts of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, of 
December 2, 1961, as revised at Geneva on November 10, 1972, on October 23, 1978, and on 
March 19, 1991 can be found on UPOV’s website, at http://www.upov.org. The UPOV is not 
about patents for inventions, but about a sui generis regime for plant varieties. Because the main 
concern of this Article is patent law, references in this Article to UPOV are to be understood 
mutatis mutandis. 
 8. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/ 
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Patent Law Treaty (PLT)9 and the CBD. Part III also briefly reports 
on the current status of international negotiations on the Requirement 
in the different fora (such as the TRIPS Council and several bodies of 
WIPO). 
Recognizing that an international solution for the gridlock is not 
in sight in the short- or mid-term, Part IV searches for possible ways 
to establish a Requirement consistent with TRIPS and other 
international instruments. Section (a) criticizes a solution that has 
already been proposed: to treat traditional knowledge holders who 
contribute genetic resources for inventions as inventors or co-
inventors. Section (b) looks at a non-statutory solution, penalizing 
unjust enrichment from the concealment of valuable information. 
Even though this solution is available, it is not cast in stone, and 
courts have varied in dealing with differences in the level of 
information between contracting parties. Section (c) revisits a 
solution based on the unclean hands doctrine. Section (d) analyzes a 
solution adopted under U.S. law and which deals with government 
material interests in inventions funded with federal resources. Even if 
the situation and the consequences of that solution are different from 
the Requirement, nevertheless, the U.S. solution provides a useful 
hint that buttresses an additional solution, proposed in section (e): 
governments of biodiversity-rich countries would be entitled to claim 
ownership in the patents covering inventions derived from genetic 
resources extracted from their territory without permission. 
Following a parallel in the regime of employees’ inventions as well 
as in the doctrines of conversion (or the right of accession in civil 
code countries), the unauthorized use by inventors of materials 
extracted from national territories would entitle those governments to 
have a material claim in the resulting title. This is, under a different 
dosage, the solution recognized by U.S. law for inventions funded by 
federal resources. 
texts/pdf/pct.pdf (entered into force on Jan. 24, 1978) [hereinafter PCT]. The PCT is 
administered by the International Bureau of WIPO. 
 9. Patent Law Treaty, opened for signature June 1, 2000, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo038en.html [hereinafter PLT]. The PLT, once it enters 
into force, will be administered by the International Bureau of WIPO. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that Part IV may indicate valuable 
solutions for adopting a TRIPS-consistent Requirement without 
changing the text of the international agreement, Part V brings a word 
of caution. It may not be that valuable to tamper with already 
complex procedures for obtaining patent rights and add an extra 
argument for challenging them. Part V concludes that patents are not 
certificates of good behavior: they are certificates of inventive 
behavior. For the sake of a reasonably efficient international patent 
system, they should remain so. 
II. THE OBJECTIVE AND NATURE OF THE REQUIREMENT 
A. The Objective of the Requirement 
In the last few years a number of developing, biodiversity-rich 
countries have insistently requested that international patent law be 
modified to permit national laws to require disclosure10 of the origin 
of genetic resources and prior informed consent of the use of 
traditional knowledge in patent applications. The Requirement has a 
single objective: to help stakeholders monitor compliance with the 
legal or contractual obligation to share benefits derived from the 
commercial use of genetic resources and/or associated traditional 
knowledge, in the light of the recommendation contained in Articles 
8 and 15.7 of the CBD.11 Article 8 provides:  
 10. Patent applicants have, primarily, the obligation of disclosing “the invention in a 
manner sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in 
the art.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 29.1. WTO Members, additionally, “may require 
the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the inventor at 
the filing date or, where priority is claimed, at the priority date of the application.” Id. 
 11. A group of developing countries identified four objectives of the Requirement: 
(a) reducing instances of bad patents; (b) enabling the patent office to ascertain more 
effectively the “inventive step” claimed in a particular patent application; (c) 
enhancing the ability of countries to track bad patents in the instances where they are 
granted and challenge the same; (d) improving compliance with their national laws on 
PIC [prior and informed consent] and fair and equitable benefit sharing prior to 
accessing a biological resource/associated traditional knowledge. 
The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, at 2–3, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/403 (June 24, 2003). 
The impact of the Requirement as a tool for assessing patentability (this is, in a nutshell, the 
objectives listed under (a), (b) and (c)) is significant only in those cases where patents have 
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Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as 
appropriate: 
. . . . 
(j) Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and 
maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous 
and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles 
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity and promote their wider application with the approval 
and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing 
of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices.12 
been applied for or obtained in regard to biological materials (plants, animals and micro-
organisms). However, in most developing countries, only micro-organisms are patentable 
subject matter, as a result of implementing article 27.3(b). Other inventions concerning living 
organisms are not. So, the proposal of that group of developing countries could have a 
significant impact in developed countries rather than in their own territories. Moreover, never 
has a patent been granted in violation of rights and interests of traditional knowledge holders in 
developing countries. So far, the reports of “biosquatting” patents have only designated patents 
issued in the United States, Europe and Japan. It seems, therefore, that the problem of “bad 
patents” is exclusively one that respects developed countries. In this Article the word 
“biosquatting” will replace the term “biopiracy.” Actually, the term “biosquatting” is more 
accurate than the word “biopiracy” for qualifying the appropriation (or misappropriation) of 
intangible components of genetic resources and/or of traditional knowledge that could be 
deemed in the public domain as well as the unauthorized claiming of traditional knowledge that 
is in control of Indigenous peoples and local communities. The reason is that the first modality 
is not necessarily illegal—in many cases, actually, private parties benefit from a loophole or a 
particular feature in the law, such as the one that only accepts written disclosure of prior art for 
the purposes of patent novelty assessment. Such claims, which impinge on knowledge that 
otherwise would be in the public domain are similar to settling “on public land in order to 
acquire title to the land,” that is, squatting in the definition of the BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1411 (7th ed. 1999). Squatting also means “entering upon lands, not claiming in good faith the 
right to do so by virtue of any title of his own or by virtue of some agreement with another who 
[one] believes to hold the title,” id., which corresponds to the misappropriation of TK that is in 
control of Indigenous and local communities. This second meaning would be closer to “piracy,” 
but not the first one. Besides, under international intellectual property law, the word “piracy” is 
linked to some practices of copyright infringement. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 51 
n.14. Accordingly, the word “cybersquatting” has been used to designate those cases of 
misappropriation of third parties’ names and brands as domain names over the Internet. The 
term “biosquatting” seems, therefore, more accurate to identify illegal or otherwise illegitimate 
intellectual property practices related to genetic resources and associated TK. 
 12. CBD, supra note 5, art. 8 (emphasis added). 
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Article 15.7 of the CBD provides: 
Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or 
policy measures, as appropriate, and in accordance with 
Articles 16 and 19 and, where necessary, through the financial 
mechanism established by Articles 20 and 21 with the aim of 
sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and 
development and the benefits arising from the commercial and 
other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting 
Party providing such resources. Such sharing shall be upon 
mutually agreed terms.13 
Failure to comply with the Requirement may be sanctioned in 
different ways. For example, it can be stipulated that willingly 
omitting information on the origin of genetic resources in a patent 
application amounts to lack of candor in the context of relations 
between a private citizen and the public administration, a breach of a 
general duty of transparency punishable by a fine or a ban on entering 
into contracts with the government. But in the field of patents, the 
sanction that has been more frequently envisaged by governments is 
the rejection of the patent application or the revocation of the 
resulting patent, if granted.14 
It is generally accepted that, once a piece of traditional knowledge 
(hereinafter “TK”)15 has been instrumental for an inventor to reach a 
 13. CBD, supra note 5, art. 15.7 (emphasis added). 
 14. This Article will focus on this last modality of sanctions, unless indicated otherwise. 
 15. The WIPO Secretariat has explained that the term “traditional knowledge” is, actually, 
a misnomer, for it comprises both technical ideas, that is, knowledge, and expressions of such 
knowledge, in the form of expressions of folklore (EOF) or traditional cultural expressions 
(TCEs) (the terms EOF and TCEs are interchangeable). In other words, the term TK has two 
different meanings.  In a broader concept, it comprises both ideas and expressions. But, in a 
stricter sense, TK means technical ideas (technical solutions developed by traditional 
communities in fields such as medicine, agriculture, and environmental protection). Therefore, 
TK lato sensu corresponds to the traditional idea/expression dichotomy that buttresses the 
general framework of intellectual property. TK lato sensu comprises two different (but 
intertwined) fields: EOF or TCEs are closer to the copyright regime; TK stricto sensu has a 
close affinity with industrial property. See Consolidated Survey of Intellectual Property 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge, ¶¶ 8–9, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/7 (Apr. 4, 
2003). It is in this narrow sense that the term TK is employed in this Article, and which has 
been defined by the WIPO Secretariat as: 
ideas developed by traditional communities and Indigenous peoples, in a traditional 
and informal way, as a response to the needs imposed by their physical and cultural 
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new, creative and useful solution to a given technical problem, it is 
predictable that the same inventor will be able to put the invention on 
the market and extract revenues from it. Under Article 15.7 of the 
CBD and the legal or contractual instruments based thereon, the 
bioprospector or his/her successor is obligated to share those 
revenues with the TK holder. As a matter of law, that obligation 
arises from the TK-derived creation and the obtaining of benefits 
from it, not from the patent. In other words, the obligation remains 
regardless of whether the practical applications derived from the TK 
are submitted as patent applications or kept as trade secrets or simply 
disclosed into the public domain. A well-written TK licensing 
agreement will contain clauses providing for monitoring of 
unauthorized use of the TK, but a problem arises when there is no 
contractual relationship between the bioprospector and the TK 
supplier, and therefore the latter has no access to the former’s 
accounting books or research records. Biosquatting then becomes a 
matter of breach of statutory measures (in those countries which have 
enacted measures on access to genetic resources and associated TK) 
or of breach of the law in general (as far as misappropriation of TK 
can be alleged). 
The practical reason for some countries’ insistence in keeping the 
Requirement is that without the voluntary16 or mandatory disclosure 
it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to assert with reasonable 
environments and that serve as means for their cultural identification; the technical 
scope of those ideas is therefore vast, and comprises all fields of technical application; 
those ideas contrast with the respective expressions, such as folk tales, poetry, and 
riddles, folk songs and instrumental music, dances, plays, etc. 
 Id. ¶ 8. The WIPO document explains further that handicrafts may be covered by either field of 
TK, or by both concomitantly, depending on their more or less utilitarian function. Id. ¶ 9. 
 16. Many patent applications do identify the origin of genetic resources used in making 
the invention, regardless of any legal constraint in that sense. See generally Asha Sukhwani, 
PATENTES NATURISTAS (Oficina Española de Patents y Marcas, Madrid). See also Patents 
Using Biological Sources Material (I) and Mention of the Country of Origin in Patents Using 
Biological Source Material (II), WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/15 (Dec. 13, 2001). The U.S. 
delegation, in its response to the questionnaire that was used as the base for the WIPO technical 
study on the Requirement, said: “[B]ased on experience, the USPTO is aware that patent 
applicants, at times, provide information about the genetic resources used in their invention, 
including the source of origin, in order to meet the written description, enablement or best mode 
requirement.” See Draft Technical Study on Disclosure Requirement Related to Genetic 
Resources and Traditional Knowledge, ¶ 60, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/10 (May 2, 
2003) [hereinafter Draft Study]. 
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certainty that a given invention has been made possible because of a 
certain hint given to the inventor on a certain use of a plant, animal or 
micro-organism. Where the invention consists of the very use of the 
plant (or of its active component) for a practical purpose,17 the link 
between the invention and the TK is more visible—if they are not 
actually the same, as it turned out in the turmeric patent. In that 
hypothesis, the TK creator should be identified as co-inventor, 
because his contribution was one of clearly inventive nature. But in 
those many countries in which new uses of known substances are not 
patentable subject matter per se, situations like the turmeric patent 
would never arise.18 In most cases TK is the hint that leads 
bioprospectors to select plants for collection and further analysis. In 
these cases there is no visible link between the final product and the 
initial lead. The invention consists of identifying the useful 
components and assessing their efficacy.19 The TK holder who gave 
 17. For example, U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 was granted for the “Use of turmeric in 
wound healing” and it was thus summarized: “Method of promoting healing of a wound by 
administering turmeric to a patient afflicted with the wound” (hereinafter designated as “the 
turmeric patent”). The patent was re-examined and invalidated, on grounds of lack of novelty, 
upon request by the Indian Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), a government 
agency linked to the Indian Ministry of Science and Technology. This was a clear-cut case in 
which a patent was granted for a traditional invention. The patent applicants had added nothing 
new or creative to what they had learned from ayurvedic traditional medicine. Nevertheless, if it 
were not for the lack of novelty, the people of Kerala might have been better off if the CSIR 
had requested the transfer of the title in the U.S. patent instead of pursuing its invalidation. 
Information on the CSIR can be obtained at http://www.csir.res.in. 
 18. See, e.g., Andean Community Decision No. 486 art. 21 (Sept. 14, 2000), available at 
http://www.sice.org/trade/JUNAC/decisiones/DEC486e.asp. 
Article 21.—Products or processes already patented and included in the state of the art 
within the meaning of article 16 of this Decision may not be the subject of new patents 
on the sole ground of having been put to a use different from that originally 
contemplated by the initial patent. 
Legislation and other documents of the Andean Community can be found on its website, at 
http://www.comunidadandina.org. 
 In the same sense, The Patents Act (1970) of India, provides: 
The following are not inventions within the meaning of this Act . . .  
(d) the mere discovery of any new property of new use for a known substance or of the 
mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results 
in a new product or employs at least one new reactant. 
Indian statutes on industrial property can be found on the Indian patent office’s website, 
http://www.patentoffice.nic.in. 
 19. Frequently the identified components are useful for purposes other than those known 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/6
p111 Carvalho book pages.doc  4/11/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  From the Shaman’s Hut to the Patent Office 121 
 
 
 
the hint and eventually supplied the samples of the resources to the 
bioprospector can be deemed instrumental to the final output of the 
inventive activity, but he is not a co-inventor and possibly would 
have a hard time trying to identify his contribution in the claimed 
invention. The Requirement, accompanied with effective deterrent 
sanctions, becomes a crucial tool to obtain compensation from the 
unauthorized use of TK. 
B. The Formal Nature of the Requirement 
The Requirement is a formal requirement, as opposed to a 
substantive one, and thus its place in the TRIPS Agreement, if ever 
adopted, should be Article 29, rather than Article 27.3(b). Substantive 
requirements are those that concern the nature of the invention itself. 
Substantive, therefore, are the elements of novelty, non-obviousness 
and utility. Those elements are not only substantive requirements but 
also substantive conditions of patentability, because the failure to 
meet them is sanctioned with either the rejection of the patent 
application or, if a posteriori, with the invalidity of the patent.20 
In contrast, formal requirements are those that concern the form in 
which the invention is submitted to the patent office. The main 
formal requirement—failure to comply with it will cause the patent 
application to be denied—is disclosure of the invention, which must 
be enabling. This formal condition is actually a consequence of the 
substantive conditions of patentability: it is by reading specifications 
that disclose the invention in an enabling manner that patent 
examiners make decisions on whether they find the invention new, 
non-obvious, and useful. 
Other formal requirements that may constitute conditions of 
patentability relate to evidence of ownership: a document assigning 
to the TK holder. 
 20. Another substantive requirement—which is not a substantive condition—is the unity 
of invention. In general, the failure to meet this requirement, if detected during the examination 
of the patent application, causes the patent application to be divided, but not rejected. If 
detected after the patent is granted, the patent is preserved. A fourth substantive condition of 
patentability—the condition of alternativeness of inventions—was identified by the United 
States Supreme Court in at least three cases. See Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The Problem of Gene 
Patents, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 701, 725–34 (2004). 
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the right to apply for the patent to the inventor’s employer, for 
example, or a statement that the applicant is the true inventor. This 
formal condition is explained by the fact that some patent laws retain 
the principle that patent rights are originally vested in the first and 
true inventors. Assignees are only entitled to acquire patent rights as 
a result of a transfer of original rights. Patent offices generally do not 
examine the issues of inventorship and ownership, because their role 
is more a technical one, but some evidence is generally required that 
identifies those upon whom the law vests the patent rights (or their 
legitimate expectations).21 
A third category of formal requirements is evidence of the 
payment of fees to patent offices. There are two categories of fees: 
procurement fees, which patent applicants must pay to patent offices 
for services rendered, and maintenance fees. Procurement fees are not 
referred to either in the TRIPS Agreement or in the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property, but they stem from 
customary administrative practices and are set as an obligation by the 
PCT and its Regulations.22 They are therefore authorized by Article 
1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. Maintenance fees, in contrast, are 
expressly mentioned by Article 5bis of the Paris Convention.23 Article 
5bis(2) authorizes Paris Union Members “to provide for the restoration 
of patents which have lapsed by reason of non-payment of fees”—
which, a contrario, means that Paris Union Members (as well as 
WTO Members, in the light of Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement) 
may provide for the lapse of patents on grounds of non-payment of 
maintenance fees. 
 21. As explained below, the TRIPS Agreement does not contain any provisions on 
ownership of inventions. It is exclusively a matter for national laws to attribute property rights 
to inventors or to third parties that are legally entitled to succeed to inventors because of certain 
material interests in the inventions (such as employers, financial sponsors, etc). The only 
obligation of WTO Members in this regard is stated in article 4ter of the Paris Convention: to 
give inventors the right to be mentioned as such in the patent. Significantly, article 4ter of the 
Paris Convention does not say that the inventor has the right to be mentioned as owner in the 
patent, but only as such, that is, as the creator, the author of the invention. 
 22. PCT, supra note 8, arts. 3(4)(iv). 4(2), 39(1), Regs 14–16. The PCT and its 
Regulations are naturally concerned with fees due in the course of the international phase of 
patent applications. But article 39(1)(a) of the PCT makes explicit reference to national fees. 
 23. Mar. 20, 1883 (last amended in 1979) [hereinafter “Paris Convention”]. The text of 
the Paris Convention as well as of the other Treaties administered by the WIPO Secretariat can 
be found on WIPO’s website, at http://www.wipo.int. 
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Evidence concerning the origin of genetic resources and prior 
informed consent of TK holders is a formal requirement in the sense 
that it does not concern the nature of the invention, but the manner in 
which the application is presented to the patent office. The 
Requirement may assume different forms according to the specific 
nature of the TK involved. When the knowledge about the origin of 
the genetic resource or the TK used in the invention is essential for 
understanding the working of the claimed invention, it becomes an 
element of the enabling disclosure. The Requirement, in such 
circumstances, is already imposed by current international and 
national patent law as a formal condition of patentability.24 
Governments’ permission to access genetic resources and TK 
holders’ authorization to use their knowledge, and/or genetic 
resources incorporating their knowledge, are not technical elements: 
they are exclusively legal elements. A patent application may, 
theoretically, describe a certain genetic resource or a piece of TK 
without the need for identifying its origin or its holder(s). But when 
TK is incorporated into the claimed invention as an inventive concept 
in its own right (such as in the turmeric patent), then the 
identification of the TK holder(s) and evidence of their prior 
informed consent become important elements for the attribution of 
inventorship and/or ownership. But the Requirement has already been 
set by current patent law, and does not generally present those 
characteristics; rather, this condition of patentability results from sui 
generis legislation that countries have gradually introduced.25 
 24. Of course, this is true only as far as information concerning the genetic resource or 
associated TK is concerned. Evidence of prior informed consent is not relevant for enabling 
disclosure purposes. 
 25. The legal treatment of the Requirement by WTO Members can be categorized into 
four different groups: (a) countries that have established the Requirement as a condition of 
patentability (thus, failure to comply will cause the rejection of the patent application and the 
invalidity of the patent, if granted): in this category, we can identify the statutes of Brazil, 
Provisional Measure No. 2.186-16, of August 23, 2001, article 31, the Member States of the 
Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), Decision 391, of July 
2, of 1996, articles 16, 26, 35 and second complementary provision and Decision 486, of 
September 14, 2000, articles 3 and 75, Costa Rica, Law No. 7.788, of 1998, article 81, Egypt, 
Law No. 82/2002, article 13, and India, The Patents Act, 1970, as amended by The Patents 
(Amendment) Act of June 25, 2002, Sections 10, 25 and 64; (b) countries that have accepted the 
Requirement but not as a formal condition for the grant and validity of patent rights: China, see 
Information Provided by WIPO Member States Concerning Provisions to Ensure the Recording 
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III. THE REQUIREMENT AS A CONDITION OF VALIDITY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND APPLICABLE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW26 
A. The TRIPS Agreement 
Three provisions in the TRIPS Agreement are relevant for 
assessing to what extent WTO Members may establish formal 
requirements (such as the Requirement) as a condition of 
patentability.27 First, under Article 29.1, WTO Members are obliged 
to impose on patent applicants the duty to disclose the invention. 
Also, WTO Members may impose on patent applicants the duty to 
identify the best mode of carrying out the invention. 
The second provision is Article 32. A question may be raised 
whether WTO Members may revoke patents for violating rules on 
access to genetic resources and/or failure to obtain informed 
authorization by TK holders. Even though Article 32 is silent on this 
of Some Contributions to Inventions, Addendum, at 1, WIPO Doc. WIPO/IP/GR/00/3/Rev.1 
(Apr. 14, 2000) and the 25 Members of the European Community, Directive 98/44/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council of July 6, 1998, on the protection of biotechnological 
inventions, Recital 27; on June 2003 Norway informed the TRIPS Council that a proposal in 
this same sense had been submitted to its Parliament, WTO Doc. IP/C/M/40 (Aug. 22, 2003), 
¶¶ 87–88; (c) countries in which the Requirement only applies in the field of patents: Egypt and 
India; and (d) countries in which the Requirement extends to other fields of industrial property 
(such as breeders’ rights and, eventually, utility models and industrial designs): Andean 
Community, Brazil and Costa Rica. 
 26. The following discussion does not analyze the disclosure related provisions of the 
FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, which was 
adopted by the FAO Conference on November 3, 2001. The reason is that the FAO Treaty does 
not provide for or even imply intellectual property protection, as the FAO representative stated 
at the second session of the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee. See Report, ¶ 15, WIPO Doc. 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/16 (Dec. 14, 2001). One commentator suggests that the Material Transfer 
Agreement (MTA) that the FAO Treaty provides for is a sort of a transparency measure. 
Nevertheless, it is not an intellectual property measure nor is it patent-related. Martin A. 
Girsberger, Transparency Measures under Patent Law Regarding Genetic Resources and 
Traditional Knowledge—Disclosure of Source and Evidence of Prior Informed Consent and 
Benefit-Sharing, 7 J. WORLD INT. PROP. 451, 466 (2004). As of the date of this writing the 
FAO International Treaty has been signed by seventy-eight countries and accepted (or ratified, 
approved or acceded to) by fifty-four countries. The Treaty entered into force on June 29, 2004. 
The text of the Treaty is available at http://www.fao.org/legal/treaties/treaty-e.htm. 
 27. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 29.1, 32, 62.1. The TRIPS provisions on 
substantive conditions of patentability are articles 27.1 and 70.8(b). 
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issue, it seems that the general understanding of WTO Members, with 
the exception of India, is that they may not.28 
The third provision is Article 62.1, which provides: 
Members may require, as a condition of the acquisition or 
maintenance of the intellectual property rights provided for 
under Section 2 through 6 of Part II, compliance with 
reasonable procedures and formalities. Such procedures and 
formalities shall be consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement.29 
Formal conditions that are not explicitly mentioned by Article 29 
must be a) reasonable and b) consistent with the provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement. The definition of “reasonableness” is not self-
evident. Because the TRIPS Agreement “occupies a relatively self-
contained, sui generis status in the WTO Agreement,” as the Panel in 
India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products30 put it, that is, as the TRIPS Agreement deals 
with intellectual property in its trade-related aspects only, one might 
conclude that “reasonable” means those formal conditions that help 
patent offices assess whether the three substantive requirements of 
Article 27.1 have been met. 
Reasonable also means the formal conditions that help patent 
offices and/or courts to identify the inventors and/or their successors 
in title. This issue comprises two different aspects: one has to do with 
the identification of the inventor; the other has to do with the 
identification of the owner.31 It is generally understood that those 
 28. See NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS, at 373–75 
(2d ed. 2005). 
 29. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 62.1. 
 30. WTO Doc. WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997), Panel Report, as modified by the Appellate 
Body Report, adopted on January 16, 1998, ¶ 7.19. 
 31. Because there is a distinction between the owner and the inventor (although they may 
be the same person), article 4 of the PCT has two separate subsections concerning the 
identification of the applicant (article 4(1)(iii)) and the identification of the inventor (article 
4(1)(v)) in the request. Subsection 1.4 states: 
Failure to indicate in the request the name and other prescribed data concerning the 
inventor shall have no consequence in any designated State whose national law 
requires the furnishing of the said indications but allows that they be furnished at a 
time later than that of the filing of a national application. Failure to furnish the said 
indications in a separate notice shall have no consequence in any designated State 
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persons who contributed with their creative minds to the inventive 
solution of a given technical problem are entitled to the patent. The 
patent cannot be attributed to third persons if they do not receive it in 
a transfer of title. In the U.S., for example, a patent application shall 
be filed the inventor or by a person authorized by the inventor. Only 
under exceptional circumstances may the application be filed by 
someone other than the inventor.32 In other countries, the application 
may be filed by a person other than the inventor (his/her employer, 
for example), provided that the applicant submits evidence of his/her 
legal right of succession (a labor contract, for example, or a statement 
by the inventor in that sense).33 The inventor’s right to the patent is 
both a material and a moral right, in the sense that the inventor has 
not only vested rights to acquire property in the fruit of his/her work, 
but also to be publicly acknowledged as such.34 
The identification of the owner, in contrast with the identification 
of the inventor, is a necessary element for the many social purposes 
that stem from property, such as levying taxes, establishing rights to 
inheritance and providing collateral. Society at large must know what 
whose national law does not require the furnishing of the said indications. 
PCT, supra note 8, art.4. Significantly, there is no parallel provision in the PCT regarding the 
applicant. This means that failure to indicate precise data on the applicant in the request does 
have consequences. 
 32. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 111, 118 (2005). 
 33. See, e.g., C.P.I. No. 9,279, art. 5.2 (Br.) Industrial Property Law 14/05 1996, No. 
9,279, art. 6.2 (1996), which authorizes those who, by means of a labor contract or a services 
contract, acquired the rights from the inventor to file for patent applications on their own behalf. 
The English version of the Brazilian statute is available on the website of WIPO’s Collection of 
Laws for Electronic Access, at http://www.wipo.int/clea/en. 
 34. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 111 deals with inventors’ material rights. But where the 
Paris Convention says that “[t]he inventor shall have the right to be mentioned as such in the 
patent,” it is recognizing inventors’ moral rights. Paris Convention, supra note 23, art. 4ter. 
Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement excludes protection of authors’ moral rights from the scope 
of the Agreement—the reason being that moral rights are not trade-related. One might wonder 
then why the TRIPS Agreement does not have a similar provision concerning inventors’ moral 
rights, because in its absence, and under article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Members 
are obliged to comply with article 4ter of the Paris Convention. The reason is that, as already 
explained, patent law is not necessarily about protecting inventors, but about appropriating 
inventions. As Bodenhausen explains, because inventors have been accorded the right, and only 
the right, to be mentioned “as such” (that is, as inventors, not as owners) in the patent, national 
law may provide for their right to waive it. G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE 
APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AS 
REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967, at 64 (reprinted 1991). That possibility does not exist under 
article 6bis of the Berne Convention—hence the need for article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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technologies are available for use without authorization, so as to 
avoid infringement. In some cases, a patent may give rise to a public 
interest not only as far as government use is concerned, but also in 
regard to exceptions to rights conferred, such as compulsory licenses. 
Thus, the PCT establishes that the identification of the applicant is 
one of the mandatory elements of the patent request (Article 4.1(iii)). 
Likewise, the draft Standard Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), in Article 4, 
says that the right to a patent shall belong to the inventor or to the 
successor in title of the inventor.35 
In view of the above, it can be submitted that requiring 
identification of not only the owner but also other persons that may 
have proprietary interests in the patent is within the scope of 
“reasonable procedures and formalities,” under Article 62.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. This is an important aspect because it explains 
why the government funding disclosure clause under 35 U.S.C. § 202 
(which requires contractors under government funding to mention in 
the patent application the fact that the invention was made under 
federal financial assistance) is TRIPS-consistent. As explained 
below, consistency arises from the fact that the government funding 
disclosure identifies proprietary interests in the claimed invention.36 
The same applies to requirements of procurement or maintenance 
fees, provided these are consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement. As explained above, both procurement and maintenance 
fees are accepted by the TRIPS Agreement, either as elements of 
WTO Members’ national legal systems and practices (Article 1.1) or 
as Paris Convention obligations (Article 2.1).37 
In conclusion, formal conditions that (a) have nothing to do with 
helping patent examiners to assess novelty, inventiveness and 
susceptibility of industrial application, (b) have no connection with 
ownership, and (c) are not aimed at evidencing the payment of fees, 
are ultimately TRIPS-inconsistent.38 
 35. The draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) is the subject matter of discussions in 
the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents.  
 36. See infra Part IV.D. 
 37. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25. 
 38. The conflict between the Requirement (as a condition of patentability) and the TRIPS 
Agreement was the subject of an exchange of views by WIPO Members at the third session of 
the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee. The United States expressed the view that such a 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p111 Carvalho book pages.doc  4/11/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 17:111 
 
 
 
It is probably because of fear of violating TRIPS that biodiversity-
rich developing countries have actively pursued in the WTO an 
amendment either to Article 27.3(b) or to Article 29, so as to 
explicitly allow for the Requirement to be included in national laws.39 
Actually, requiring information on the origin of materials or the 
consent of persons whose knowledge has been directly or indirectly 
used in the development of the invention would be TRIPS-consistent 
only if, besides being reasonable for the purposes of Article 62, it 
extended to all fields of technology. To confine the Requirement to 
the area of biotechnological inventions is an act of discrimination as 
to the field of technology, under Article 27.1.40 
The need to implement Article 15 of the CBD is no excuse, 
because Article 27.1 admits no exceptions other than those it 
specifically identifies.41 Moreover, the CBD not being a WTO 
Agreement, Article XX(d) of GATT 1994 would not justify the 
discrimination against a field of technology in violation of the 
provisions of an annex to the WTO Agreement. Actually, the WTO 
being an Agreement about customs barriers, the WTO has Members 
that are not Contracting Parties to the CBD. It would not be 
reasonable to impose on those Members an obligation they are not 
bound to observe.42 
Requirement does not keep with the TRIPS Agreement. Report, ¶ 71, WIPO Doc. 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/17 (June 21, 2002). The Dominican Republic, id. ¶ 70, Sri Lanka, id. ¶ 75, 
Egypt and Sudan, id. ¶ 76, expressed an opposed understanding. 
 39. See infra Part III.F. 
 40. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 27.1. It should be emphasized that the 
discriminatory nature would not be in requiring the identification of the origin of the genetic 
resources, but in doing so in respect of patent applications in the field of biotechnology only. 
Therefore, it would not be discriminatory to impose the Requirement in regard to all patent 
applications, regardless of their field of technology. Of course, one might allege that the 
Requirement would ultimately discriminate against other sorts of raw materials, such as 
minerals. But article 27.1 is clear in prohibiting discrimination as to the nature of the 
inventions, rather than to the type of raw materials. And, secondly, it is admitted that biological 
resources and tangible raw materials are different in nature because what matters in the former 
is the genetic and chemical information they contain. The Requirement, once it addresses 
genetic material, is therefore tolerated as a kind of differential treatment, as opposed to a 
discriminatory one. See CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 
168–70. 
 41. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 27.1. As it will be explained below, actually it is 
CBD Contracting Parties that are under the obligation to respect international agreements on 
intellectual property, and not the other way around. See infra Part III.E. 
 42. One commentator has expressed his dissent with this view. Dutfield wrote: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/6
p111 Carvalho book pages.doc  4/11/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  From the Shaman’s Hut to the Patent Office 129 
 
 
 
In conclusion, WTO Members may adopt the Requirement as a 
mechanism for monitoring compliance with the CBD provisions on 
benefit sharing, but only if it does not constitute a condition for 
acquiring intellectual property rights which depend on registration, 
and provided that it is consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement, namely Articles 3, 4, and 27.1.43 
There is no compelling reason at all why the compulsory submission of a document, 
such as a certificate of origin, would impose another substantive condition as long as it 
is not linked to determining the patentability of the invention. After all examination 
and renewal fees have to be paid by patent applicants and owners, and TRIPS does not 
prevent them merely because they are not mentioned in the Agreement. Similarly, the 
submission of documentation attesting to the fact that the applicant had complied with 
the relevant ABS [access and benefit sharing] regulations, such as a certificate of 
origin, would be just another administrative requirement. 
Graham Dutfield, Sharing the Benefits of Biodiversity—Is There a Role for the Patent System?, 
5 J. WORLD INT. PROP. 899, 921 (2002). This line of reasoning can be challenged on several 
grounds. Of course, there are some aspects of patent law that are not mentioned in the TRIPS 
Agreement. But one must distinguish between those aspects that are not mentioned because 
negotiators thought they were already implied, and those that negotiators did not mention 
because of their incompatibility with WTO principles and rules. As explained above, the 
requirement concerning evidence of the timely payment of fees is not similar to the 
Requirement because the obligation to pay procurement fees was already a legal practice in 
WTO Members before the entry of the TRIPS Agreement into force (namely, under PCT 
provisions), and therefore, it is adopted under article 1.1. Furthermore, payment of maintenance 
fees is subject to Paris Convention provisions, which have been incorporated by reference in the 
TRIPS Agreement. On the other hand, the Requirement is not a matter of “another substantive 
condition,” but rather a formal one, because it does not concern the invention itself. And, as far 
as formal conditions are concerned, the controlling provisions are articles 29 and 62. A formal 
condition is acceptable only when it is already covered by a provision of the Agreement (such 
as article 29) or when it is reasonable. That commentator does not explain why it would be 
reasonable to adopt a condition that aims at implementing a treaty that is not part of the WTO. 
Furthermore, as explained below, it is not reasonable to adopt a formal condition of 
patentability that creates tension with the TRIPS Agreement with the aim of implementing the 
CBD, when the CBD itself requires that all measures concerning benefit sharing must comply 
with international treaties on intellectual property (such as the UPOV Convention, the PCT and 
the TRIPS Agreement itself).  
 43. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 3,4, 27.1. Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement 
seems to confine measures in the field of patents aimed at generating barriers to patentability to 
geographical borders. But in the case of the Requirement, neither article 27.2 nor the national 
treatment principle would necessarily stand in its way. The reasons are that (a) the Requirement 
does not give rise to an exclusion from patentability, but rather to some sanctions against illegal 
access (which may comprise, in some countries, patent invalidation); (b) the Requirement 
concerns resources that may serve as raw materials for inventions, not the nationality of patent 
applicants. Curiously, Bolivia has once attempted to justify the consistency of the Requirement 
as established in the statutes of the Andean Community (see supra note 25) to which it is bound 
by invoking Article 29.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. During the review of Bolivia’s 
implementing legislation in the TRIPS Council, Japan asked the following question: 
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B. The UPOV Convention(s) 
On the other hand, those WTO Members that are also Members of 
the UPOV may not revoke plant variety certificates on grounds of 
failure to inform the origin of genetic resources and prior informed 
consent. In fact, both UPOV 1978 and 199144 texts provide that plant 
varieties certificates may be annulled only when the varieties fail to 
meet the conditions of novelty and distinctness. Certificates may also 
be cancelled, but only when the varieties fail to meet the conditions 
of uniformity or stability as well as the following formal 
requirements: the breeder failed to provide the authority with the 
information, documents or materials deemed necessary for the 
maintenance of the variety (namely, its stability); the breeder failed to 
pay maintenance fees; the breeder did not propose a suitable 
denomination to replace the denomination previously submitted and 
which has been cancelled after the grant of the right.45 More 
importantly, the grounds for annulling or canceling plant varieties 
certificates may not be expanded by UPOV Members.46 This means 
that a breeder that develops a variety based upon a plant genetic 
resource unlawfully collected shall not have the respective certificate 
annulled or cancelled by any UPOV Member on the ground that 
 Please explain the relationship between Article 29.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and 
Articles 26(h) and (I) of Decision 486 which oblige patent applicants to submit a copy 
of the contract for access to genetic resources and a copy of the documents certifying 
the authorization to use of traditional knowledge. Does your country consider the 
above-mentioned applicant’s obligation as an enablement requirement which is clearly 
stipulated in Article 29.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, or as an additional requirement 
which is not stipulated in that Article? 
 Bolivia answered that Article 26(h) of Decision 486 “fit within [the] context” of Article 
29.2 of the TRIPS Agreement (which authorizes WTO Members to require patent applicants to 
provide for information concerning the results of corresponding applications in other countries). 
TRIPS Article 29.2, supra note 6. But, in response to a follow-up question posed by Japan, 
Bolivia corrected its obviously mistaken answer and clarified that the Requirement was a matter 
of not allowing patents to be granted on inventions based on unlawfully obtained genetic 
resources. In other words, the Requirement had nothing to do with either paragraph 1 or 2 of 
Article 29. See Review of Legislation (Bolivia), WTO Doc. IP/Q3/BOL/1 (Feb. 13, 2002), at 
40–42. 
 44. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961 
[hereinafter UPOV] (as revised on Oct. 23, 1978 and Mar. 19, 1991). 
 45. UPOV 1991, supra note 44, arts. 21–22; see also UPOV 1978 art. 10. 
 46. Id. 
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he/she has failed to comply with national laws concerning access to 
genetic resources. This view was affirmed by the UPOV Secretariat 
in a communication addressed to the TRIPS Council: 
 UPOV is not opposed to the disclosure, per se, of countries 
of origin or geographical origin of genetic resources in any 
way that will facilitate the examination mentioned above, but 
could not accept this as an additional condition of protection. 
 Thus, if a country decides, in the frame of its overall policy, 
to introduce a mechanism for the disclosure of countries of 
origin or geographical origin of genetic resources, such a 
mechanism should not be introduced in a narrow sense, as a 
condition for plant variety protection.47 
In conclusion, UPOV members may adopt the Requirement, 
provided it does not constitute a condition for obtaining or 
maintaining plant breeders’ rights. 
C. The Patent Cooperation Treaty 
Parties to the PCT may not impose the Requirement, either as a 
condition of patentability or not, on international applications with 
the purpose of monitoring compliance with the CBD. Article 27.1 of 
the PCT (on “National requirements”) provides that “[n]o national 
law shall require compliance with requirements relating to the form 
or contents of the international application different from or 
additional to those which are provided for in this Treaty and the 
Regulations.”48 
At the diplomatic conference of Washington, in 1970, there was a 
brief discussion about the meaning of the word “contents” in Article 
27.1. A Canadian delegate asked whether the word “contents” (and 
its French version “contenu”) was used with “the intent to cover 
 47. Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b), Relationship Between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity and Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore, Information from Intergovernmental Organizations, Addendum, 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), at 4, WTO Doc. 
IP/C/W/347/Add.3 (June 11, 2002). 
 48. PCT, supra note 8, art. 27.1 (emphasis added). 
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everything in the application from the point of view of substance, or 
simply to refer to matters that were, so to speak, treated in the 
application.”49 The Secretary General of the Conference replied that 
the latter was intended.50 Indeed, a footnote to the Final Text of 
Article 27.1 of the PCT explains that: 
The requirements relating to form and contents are principally 
provided for in Articles 3 (The International Application), 4 
(The Request), 5 (The Description), 6 (The Claims), 7 (The 
Drawings), and 8 (Claiming Priority), and the Rules pertaining 
to these Articles (mainly Rules 3 to 13). The words “form or 
contents” are used merely to emphasize something that could 
go without saying, namely, that requirements of substantive 
patent law (criteria of patentability, etc) are not meant.51 
Article 27.5 of the PCT supports a contrario the understanding 
that no formal requirements other than those explicitly set out in the 
Treaty can be established on international applications.52 The 
requirement to disclose the origin of genetic resources and to give 
evidence of prior informed consent, being a formal requirement, is 
therefore prohibited in the PCT context. Paragraph 8 of Article 27 
contains exceptions to the provisions of paragraph 1,53 but those do 
 49. RECORDS OF THE WASHINGTON DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE PATENT 
COOPERATION TREATY, 1970 at 553 (WIPO 1972). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 35. 
 52. PCT, supra note 8, art. 27.5. Article 27.5 of the PCT reads: 
Nothing in this Treaty and the Regulations is intended to be construed as prescribing 
anything that would limit the freedom of each Contracting State to prescribe such 
substantive conditions of patentability as it desires. In particular, any provision in this 
Treaty and the Regulations concerning the definition of prior art is exclusively for the 
purposes of the international procedure and, consequently, any Contracting State is 
free to apply, when determining the patentability of an invention claimed in an 
international application, the criteria of its national law in respect of prior art and other 
conditions of patentability not constituting requirements as to the form and contents of 
applications. 
 53. PCT art. 27.8. reads: 
Nothing in this Treaty and the Regulations is intended to be construed as limiting the 
freedom of any Contracting State to apply measures deemed necessary for the 
preservation of its national security or to limit, for the protection of the general 
economic interests of that State, the right of its own residents or nationals to file 
international applications. 
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not comprise the Requirement. Actually, Article 27.8 acknowledges 
some restrictions established by PCT Members (such as the United 
States) imposed on their own nationals in regard to the filing of 
patent applications in other countries, for reasons of national security 
or other reasons of national policy. Obviously, this is not a condition 
of patentability, but a matter of permitting the filing of patent 
applications. In conclusion, international patent applicants, under the 
PCT system, may not be required to add elements or documents to 
the patent applications that are designated to follow the so-called 
“PCT route” beyond those contained in the Treaty.54 
In conclusion, the Requirement is not allowed under the PCT 
either as condition of patentability or as an additional requirement 
during the international phase. We will see below, however, that this 
rule applies in regard to the Requirement as an element for 
monitoring compliance with the CBD. But if the Requirement is 
adopted in the context of assessing proprietary interests, the PCT is 
no obstacle to its adoption in national laws. In that event, the 
Requirement ceases to be a formality aimed at assessing a certain 
type of disclosure—it is rather aimed at identifying the holder(s) of 
property rights and interests in the claimed inventions. Moreover, 
nothing in the PCT and its regulations stands in the way of PCT 
Members to adopt additional formal requirements once the 
application enters the national phase.55 
 54. This same view was expressed by the delegation of Norway in the TRIPS Council: 
The PCT explicitly prohibited any requirement which was different from or additional 
to the requirements provided for in the PCT or its Regulations. Thus, the PCT 
constituted an important obstacle to the introduction of a system where an international 
patent application covering biotechnological inventions should contain a reference to 
the source of origin. 
Minutes of Meeting, ¶ 100, WTO Doc. IP/C/M/42 (Feb. 4, 2004). 
 55. See, for example, 35 U.S.C. § 371(c)(4) (2000), requesting an additional document 
containing an oath or declaration of the inventor (or other person authorized under chapter 11 of 
Title 35) complying with the requirements of section 115, once an international application 
enters the national phase in the United States. 
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D. The Patent Law Treaty 
Article 10.1 of the PLT reads: 
 Non-compliance with one or more of the formal 
requirements referred to in Articles 6(1), (2), (4) and (5) and 8 
(1) to (4), with respect to an application may not be a ground 
for revocation or invalidation of a patent, either totally or in 
part, except where the non-compliance with the formal 
requirement occurred as a result of a fraudulent intention.56 
According to Article 6.1 of the PLT, 
 Except where otherwise provided for by [the PLT], no 
Contracting Party shall require compliance with any 
requirement relating to the form or contents of an application 
different from or additional to the requirements relating to 
form or contents which are provided for in respect of 
international applications under the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty.57 
In other words, formal conditions of patentability that are not 
provided either in the PCT or in the PLT itself are not allowed by the 
PLT. Given that the Requirement is, as shown, inconsistent with the 
PCT and that the PLT has no provision approving it,58 the 
Requirement is also inconsistent with the PLT. 
Finally, because the PLT is complementary to the PCT, in that it 
applies to national and regional patent applications permitted under 
the PCT,59 the conclusion is that the Requirement is inconsistent with 
the PLT (as a condition of patentability or not) both at the 
international and the national phases. 
 56. PLT, supra note 9, art. 10.1. 
 57. Id. art. 6. 
 58. Additional, formal conditions of patentability, under the PLT, are that the contents of 
an application “which correspond to the contents of the request of an international application 
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty be submitted under a special request form,” the payment of 
fees, evidence of priority, and the form and means of transmittal of communications 
(concerning the patent application) to the Patent Offices. PLT, supra note 9, arts. 6, 8. 
 59. PLT, supra note 9, art. 3.1. 
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E. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
It is generally understood that the Requirement is necessary to 
help Contracting Parties to the CBD monitor compliance by 
bioprospectors and/or their successors with national legislation on 
access to genetic resources. It is also assumed that the Requirement 
stems logically from the provisions of Articles 8(j) and 15.7 of the 
CBD.60 However, the Requirement, when adopted as a (formal) 
condition of patentability, is in violation of not only the TRIPS 
Agreement, the UPOV Convention, the PLT and, eventually, if 
adopted in the international phase, the PCT, but also the CBD itself. 
 Where Article 15.7 of the CBD suggests that Contracting Parties 
should take legislative measures with the aim of sharing benefits 
arising from the commercial exploitation of genetic resources, it says 
that they should do so “in accordance with Articles 16 and 19.”61 The 
expression “in accordance with Article 16” means two things. 
First, access to genetic resources in developing countries may 
require technology that is in the hands of private companies in 
developed countries. Therefore, in order to obtain technology that 
will create the means for accessing their genetic resources, 
developing countries shall observe Article 16, which provides for 
measures that “facilitate access for and transfer to other Contracting 
Parties of technologies that are relevant to the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity or make use of genetic 
resources and do not cause significant damage to the environment.”62 
It has been suggested that the reference to Article 16 “expands the 
potential benefits [to be shared with suppliers of genetic resources] to 
include: access to and transfer of technology using the genetic 
resources.”63 This aspect, however, is not clear. When Article 15.7 
says that measures will be taken “in accordance with,” it seems that it 
 60. See supra note 11. 
 61. CBD, supra note 5, art. 15.7. Interestingly, article 15.7 advises that benefits should be 
shared through the financial mechanism of articles 20 and 21, which dismisses the idea of an 
intellectual property contract approach (under which benefits could be extracted from royalties, 
for example). 
 62. Id. art. 16.1. 
 63. LYLE GLOWKA ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 82 
(1994). 
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is referring to procedural requirements that the measures must obey, 
and not to the scope of the benefits. If the intention were to expand 
the nature of benefits, the provision’s language would be different. 
For example, the mention of the results of research and development 
and the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources could 
be followed by the expression “including the benefits referred to in 
Articles 16 and 19.” This view is corroborated by the fact that Article 
19 is not about concessions (access to biotechnology shall be on 
mutually agreed terms), but about procedures that must be respected 
in order to establish joint research ventures. 
Second, the measures taken must be in accordance with 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 16, which contain rules on technology 
transfer: “such access and transfer [and, under Article 15.7, all 
measures aiming at promoting benefit sharing] shall be provided on 
terms which recognize and are consistent with the adequate and 
effective protection of intellectual property rights” as well as “in 
accordance with international law.”64 In other words, all measures 
aimed at implementing Article 15.7, including measures to monitor 
compliance with the obligation of benefit sharing, must respect 
Contracting Parties’ international obligations under intellectual 
property agreements—which, as shown above, do not permit the 
adoption of the Requirement as a condition for obtaining rights.65 
Therefore, any measures aimed at monitoring compliance with 
benefit sharing obligations that are inconsistent with international 
intellectual property treaties are also inconsistent with the CBD itself. 
It is true that Article 16.5, which invites Contracting Parties to make 
efforts to avoid infringing patent and other intellectual property 
rights, creates obstacles for the implementation of CBD objectives. 
However, those efforts shall be made “subject to national legislation 
 64. CBD, supra note 5, arts. 15–16. 
 65. UPOV 1978 and the PCT were already in force when the CBD was negotiated and 
agreed, in 1992. UPOV 1991 and the TRIPS Agreement, which was signed in April 15, 1994, at 
Marrakesh, as an Annex of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
had their terms already negotiated. Between December 21, 1991, when the Director General of 
the GATT communicated the results of the Uruguay Round so far reached, and April 15, 1994, 
only a few minor aspects of the TRIPS Agreement were changed. But the TRIPS Agreement 
remained essentially the same, which means that the CBD Contracting Parties in 1992 were 
already aware of those obligations. 
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and international law.”66 This means that, for Contracting Parties to 
be excused from observing current international obligations under 
intellectual property treaties, they must provide for the amendment of 
those treaties. But until that happens, they are obliged by the CBD 
itself to observe those treaties. The only conclusion possible is that 
countries that implement Article 15.7 through measures that are 
inconsistent with international treaties on intellectual property (such 
as adopting the Requirement as a condition of patentability) are in 
violation of the CBD itself. It could be argued, however, that Article 
15.7 of the CBD applies to genetic resources only, in contrast with 
Article 8(j), which refers to knowledge, that is, to intangible assets, 
and which contains no parallel obligation to comply with Article 16.67 
In other words, one might argue that the CBD does not require 
measures aimed at monitoring compliance of contracts of TK 
licensing (either independently from access to genetic resources or in 
combination with it) with international treaties on intellectual 
property. But that argument would be wrong: the CBD is about 
tangible biological diversity and the intangible component is not 
defined as an integral part of genetic resources. TK, for the CBD, is 
complementary and accessory to genetic resources, and not an 
independent component, worthy of separate rules. In other words, 
measures taken under Article 8(j), because they are complementary 
and subordinated to those under Article 15.7, must likewise respect 
intellectual property-related international obligations. 
Another argument that could be raised is that Article 15.5, which 
submits access to prior informed consent, makes no reference to 
international treaties on intellectual property. Compliance with the 
obligation of obtaining prior informed consent, therefore, could be 
monitored regardless of international obligations in the area of 
intellectual property. To that extent, prior informed consent would 
give rise to stand-alone obligations under the CBD. Such an 
argument, however, would be flawed. The reason is that Article 15.4 
makes access subject to “the provisions of this Article,” which 
necessarily include those of paragraph 7.68 In other words, measures 
 66. CBD, supra note 5, art. 16.5. 
 67. Id. arts. 8, 15. 
 68. Id. art. 15.4. 
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aiming to implement the obligation of obtaining prior informed 
consent are, like those concerning benefit sharing, subject to 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 16.  
F. Current Multilateral Negotiations 
There have been attempts to include the Requirement in 
international treaties. Those attempts have two different purposes. 
One, obviously, is to produce effects in territories other than those 
from which the genetic resources and TK were extracted. As a matter 
of fact, although genetic resources are raw materials for all sorts of 
inventions in all fields of technology, they are more important in the 
biotechnology field. And the main markets for biotechnology 
processes and products are in developed countries, where most patent 
applications in that area are filed. It follows that limiting the 
application of the Requirement to developing countries does not have 
practical consequences. With that in mind, during the discussions in 
the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents (SCP), in 
September of 1999, on the draft Treaty on the Law of Patents (PLT), 
Colombia proposed the addition of the following provision: 
1. All industrial property protection shall guarantee the 
protection of the country’s biological and genetic heritage. 
Consequently, the grant of patents or registrations that relate to 
elements of that heritage shall be subject to their having been 
acquired legally. 
2. Every document shall specify the registration number of the 
contract affording access to genetic resources and a copy 
thereof where the goods or services for which protection is 
sought have been manufactured or developed from genetic 
resources, or products thereof, of which one of the member 
countries is the country of origin.69 
The SCP did not reach a consensus on this proposal,70 and WIPO 
Member States subsequently revisited the issue no less than five 
 69. Protection of Biological and Genetic Resources, WIPO Doc. SCP/3/10 (Sept. 8, 
1999). 
 70. See Report, ¶¶ 202–09, WIPO Doc. SCP/3/11 (Sept. 14, 1999). 
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times. In November 1999, the WIPO Working Group on 
Biotechnology held informal discussions on Colombia’s proposal and 
issued a questionnaire aimed at identifying the intentions of WIPO 
Member States as to the eventual adoption of the Requirement at the 
national or regional level.71 The WIPO Meeting on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, held in Geneva in April 2000, 
discussed the responses to that questionnaire as well as other issues 
concerning TK, in preparation for the Diplomatic Conference for the 
adoption of the PLT. In that venue, Colombia softened its proposal: it 
no longer suggested that the provision had a mandatory nature, but 
rather that it merely permitted Parties to the future PLT to adopt the 
Requirement at the national level. Colombia’s argument was that it 
was afraid that, without such permission, the Second Complementary 
Provision of Andean Community Decision No. 39172 would be in 
conflict with the future Treaty. The new proposal read as follows: 
“When necessary, and if the invention has been obtained from 
genetic and/or biological resources, any Contracting Party may 
demand that a copy of the document issued by the competent national 
authority attesting the legality of access to those resources be 
submitted to the Office.”73 Subsequently, on the first day of the 
Diplomatic Conference, on May 11, 2000, WIPO Members held 
negotiations on Colombia’s new proposal, the outcome of which was 
the grant of a mandate to WIPO’s Director General to take the action 
necessary to establish a forum where Member States could exchange 
views on matters concerning protection of traditional knowledge, 
expressions of folklore and access to genetic resources. After 
intensive consultations, the Director General of WIPO proposed, and 
the Assemblies approved, in September 2000, the establishment of 
the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (hereinafter 
 71. See WIPO Doc. WIPO/IP/GR/00/3/Rev.1, supra note 25. 
 72. See supra note 25. 
 73. WIPO Doc. WIPO/GR/00/4 (Apr. 14, 2000) (document on file with the WIPO 
Secretariat). Two elements in this proposal made it optional for PLT Contracting Parties: first, it 
could be adopted only when Members thought it was necessary (for example, necessary for 
implementing the CBD); and, second, the word “may” expresses an authorization, not a 
mandatory action. 
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designated as the “Intergovernmental Committee”).74 The 
Requirement was again discussed in WIPO after a request from the 
Secretariat of the CBD, conveying to the Intergovernmental 
Committee the invitation by the Conference of the Parties that the 
WIPO Secretariat prepare a study 
on methods consistent with obligations in treaties administered 
by the World Intellectual Property Organization for requiring 
the disclosure within patent applications of, inter alia: (a) 
Genetic resources utilized in the development of the claimed 
inventions; (b) The country of origin of genetic resources 
utilized in the claimed inventions; (c) Associated traditional 
knowledge, innovations and practices utilized in the 
development of the claimed inventions; (d) The source of 
associated traditional knowledge, innovations and practices; 
and (e) Evidence of prior informed consent.75 
The resulting WIPO study scrutinizes the Requirement and its 
possible technical and legal implications in a very thorough and 
consistent fashion, but, as a matter of course, it does not state an 
opinion on its compatibility with international treaties or propose 
new, alternative solutions.76 The WIPO Secretariat has not such a 
mandate. 
More recently, and again in the SCP, which is currently having 
discussions on a Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty,77 the 
 74. See Matters Concerning Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/26/6 (Aug. 7, 2000); Report of the Twenty-Sixth 
(12th Extraordinary) session of the WIPO General Assembly, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/26/10 (Oct. 
3, 2000). 
 75. See WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/10, supra note 16, Annex, at 3. 
 76. See supra note 16. 
 77. See Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, WIPO Doc. SCP/8/2 (Oct. 16, 2002); 
Practice Guidelines Under the Substantive Patent Law Treaty, WIPO Doc. SCP/8/4 (Oct. 16, 
2002). The draft SPLT contrasts with the PLT in the sense that it goes beyond merely 
procedural provisions, and contains substantive rules of patent law, namely rules on conditions 
of patentability and on revocation. However, if we take the word “substantive” with its narrow 
meaning of standards of rights granted and protected (in other words, the standards concerning 
the scope of patent rights)—as the TRIPS Agreement does in section 5 of part II—then the 
SPLT, which is mostly concerned with the harmonization of conditions of patentability, does 
not cover actual substantive law. It is true that conditions of patentability do have an impact on 
the definition of standards of rights protected, but they are not substantive standards themselves. 
The only substantive provision that the current draft of the SPLT contains is article 4, on 
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Dominican Republic, on behalf of a group of countries,78 proposed to 
amend paragraph 2 of draft Article 2 (on “General Principles”), 
which, after the change, would read: 
Nothing in this Treaty and the Regulations shall limit the 
freedom of a Contracting Party to take any action it deems 
necessary for the preservation of essential security interests or 
to comply with international obligations, including those 
relating to the protection of genetic resources, biological 
diversities, traditional knowledge and the environment. 
Brazil has also suggested an amendment to Article 13 (on 
“Grounds for Refusal of a Claimed Invention”)79 of the draft SPLT, 
which would read: “[Compliance with Applicable Law on Other 
Matters] A Contracting Party may also require compliance with the 
applicable law on access to genetic resources, protection of 
traditional knowledge . . . .”80 These two proposals aim at avoiding 
the same conflict that exists under the PCT and the PLT. In an 
explanatory note, however, the Dominican Republic justifies its 
proposal with the need to fulfill international commitments under the 
CBD. To that extent, therefore, the argument becomes circular: as 
explained above, in order to comply with the CBD, countries must 
comply with international agreements on intellectual property; the 
violation of the latter leads to the violation of the CBD itself. 
Therefore, in order to comply with the CBD, it is necessary to include 
the Requirement in intellectual property treaties. However, because 
the Requirement is not established in the CBD—on the contrary, 
unless intellectual property treaties are modified, the CBD prohibits 
inventorship/ownership—the language of which, incidentally, has been borrowed from the draft 
Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention as far as Patents Are Concerned, article 9. The 
Diplomatic Conference convened (at The Hague, on June 3 to 28, 1991) to adopt this draft 
Treaty failed to reach a conclusion. Nevertheless, some of its provisions were later incorporated 
into section 5, part II, of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 78. The countries are: Chile, Colombia, Cuba, The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela. 
 79. The Brazilian proposal also impacts article 14 of the SPLT, which deals with 
revocation of patents. 
 80. See Proposals by the Delegations of the Dominican Republic and Brazil Concerning 
Articles 2, 13 and 14 of the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, WIPO Doc. SCP/8/5 (Nov. 5, 
2002), Annexes I and II. 
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it—it makes no sense to amend the draft SPLT (or, for that matter, 
any treaty in force) to permit Contracting Parties to enact measures 
“in order to comply with international obligations” (as proposed by 
the Dominican Republic) or to impose “the applicable law on . . . 
access to genetic resources” (as proposed by Brazil).81 The two 
proposals are, in fact, circular. Because those obligations are not 
explicitly stated in the CBD, they cannot be assumed. For the 
proposals to make sense it would be better to adopt the language 
proposed by Colombia during the negotiations that led to the 
adoption of the PLT. Or, as it will be explained below, countries can 
adopt the Requirement, although not as a condition of patentability 
with the goal of implementing the CBD, but rather as a measure for 
establishing proprietary interests derived from the material 
contributions to the inventive output. Anyway, the two proposals 
have already been the subject matter of discussions in the SCP,82 but 
in view of the different opinions as to whether the SCP is the 
appropriate forum to address the issue, it was decided to include the 
two proposals in the text of the draft SPLT in square brackets, 
accompanied by the following note: “The SCP agreed at its eighth 
session to include the paragraphs in square brackets, but to postpone 
substantive discussions on these provisions.”83 
More recently, Switzerland proposed to include the Requirement 
in the Regulations under the PCT.84 According to the Swiss proposal, 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Report, Eighth Session of the SCP, ¶¶ 37–49, WIPO Doc. SCP/8/9 (Dec. 18, 
2002). 
 83. Id. ¶ 49; see also Summary by the Chair, ¶ 11, WIPO Doc. SCP/8/8 (Nov. 29, 2002) 
11. At the tenth session of the SCP, the United States, Japan and the European Patent Office 
proposed to focus discussions on a “first package of provisions,” comprising the definition of 
prior art, the grace period, novelty and non-obviousness. See Proposal from the United States of 
America, Japan, and the European Patent Office Regarding the Substantive Patent Law Treaty 
(SPLT), at 2, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/9 (Apr. 22, 2004), Annex. The SCP has not reached 
consensus on that proposal. See Summary by the Chair, ¶ 67, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/10 (May 14, 
2004). 
 84. Switzerland proposed to amend Rules 51bis.1 (by introducing a new subparagraph 
(g)) and 4.17 (by introducing a new subparagraph (vi). The Swiss proposal and its justification 
were submitted to the Fourth Session of the Working Group on Reform of the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) held on May 19 to 23, 2003. Proposals by Switzerland Regarding 
the Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent 
Applications, WIPO Doc. PCT/R/WG/4/13 (May 5, 2003). The proposal was discussed by the 
Working Group at that same session as well as the session it held from November 17 to 21, 
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the Requirement could be imposed by national laws in the national 
phase of international applications. The participants of the Working 
Group on Reform of the PCT have not reached an agreement. Some 
delegations would accept the proposal not only because they saw it as 
“constructive and pragmatic,” but also because the PCT was a good 
starting point for changing international law because the proposal 
would have an impact on national patent applications.85 Other 
delegations, however, said that the WIPO Intergovernmental 
Committee is a more adequate forum to discuss the proposal.86 Other 
delegations were not convinced that the patent system was the proper 
context in which to address concerns of benefit sharing because 
implementing measures whereby patents might be invalidated for 
failure to comply with the requirements of disclosure of source would 
reduce certainty in patent rights, increase litigation, and reduce patent 
filings.87 The topic continues under discussion in the Working 
Group.88 
Some WTO Members have addressed the Requirement several 
times in discussions in the TRIPS Council—the idea would be to 
amend the TRIPS Agreement so as to establish the Requirement as an 
additional formal condition of patentability. That discussion was 
inaugurated by India in 1997, with a document submitted to the 
Committee on Trade and Environment,89 but was soon transferred to 
2003. See Summary of the Session by the Chair, WIPO Doc. PCT/R/WG/4/14 (May 23, 2003), 
and PCT/R/WG/5/13 (Nov. 21, 2003)—at this session the Swiss proposal was re-submitted as 
WIPO Doc. PCT/R/WG/5/11 Rev. (Nov. 19, 2003). See also Additional Comments by 
Switzerland on its Proposal Regarding the Declaration of Source of Genetic Resources and 
Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, WIPO Doc. PCT/R/WG/6/11 (Apr. 21, 2004). 
The United States delegation has stated that it could not support the Swiss proposal. See supra 
note 3. For a detailed discussion of the Swiss proposal and the current status of multilateral 
negotiations, see generally Martin A. Girsberger, Transparency Measures, supra note 26. 
 85. See Summary of the Session, ¶ 133, WIPO Doc. PCT/R/WG/5/13 (Nov. 21, 2003). 
 86. Id. ¶¶ 131, 134. 
 87. Id. ¶ 135. 
 88. Id. ¶ 144; see also Summary of the Session, ¶¶ 82–104, WIPO Doc. PCT/R/WG/6/12 
(May 7, 2004). 
 89. For an overview of the debates on the Requirement and other TK-related issues in the 
WTO, see The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and The Convention on Biological 
Diversity—Summary of Issues and Points Made, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/368 (Aug. 8, 2002); 
Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b)—Summary of Issues Raised and Points Made, WTO 
Doc. IP/C/W/369 (Aug. 8, 2002), and The Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore—
Summary of Issues Raised and Points Made, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/370 
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the TRIPS Council in the context of the review of Article 27.3(b) of 
the TRIPS Agreement. Subsequently, in the preparations for the 
fourth session of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, several 
WTO Members raised the issue again.90 The Ministerial Declaration, 
approved in Doha, included the relationship between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the CBD, the protection of traditional knowledge and 
folklore as topics of the work program to be pursued by the Council 
for TRIPS under the review of Article 27.3(b).91 But the debate has 
not made substantive progress since Doha. Papers were submitted by 
the European Communities,92 a group of developing countries,93 
Switzerland94 and the African Group.95 The papers by the group of 
developing countries and the African Group sought the possible 
incorporation of the Requirement into the TRIPS Agreement. 
Switzerland communicated its proposal concerning the amendment of 
the Regulations under the PCT. And the European Communities 
reiterate their view that the Requirement “should not act, de facto or 
de jure, as an additional formal or substantial patentability criterion. 
Legal consequences of the non-respect of the requirement should lie 
outside the ambit of patent law.”96 With the purpose of giving focus 
(Aug. 8, 2002). 
 90. See, e.g., The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/356 
(June 24, 2002), (proposal by Brazil, China, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, 
Pakistan, Thailand, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe). 
 91. Ministerial Declaration, ¶ 19, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001). It 
should be noted that, according to ¶ 52 of the Ministerial Declaration, the work program does 
not necessarily entail negotiations on new standards. The TRIPS Council may, therefore (and it 
probably will), keep its focus on TK (and, particularly, on stricto sensu TK) at the level of 
discussions and exchange of views.  
 92. Review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, and the Relationship Between the 
TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore—A Concept Paper, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/383 (Oct. 17, 
2002). 
 93. The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, WTODoc. IP/C/W/403 (June 24, 2003) 
(submission by Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Peru, Thailand and 
Venezuela). 
 94. Article 27.3(b), the Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention of 
Biological Diversity, and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, WTO Doc. 
IP/C/W/400/Rev.1 (June 18, 2003). 
 95. See Taking Forward the Review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO 
Doc. IP/C/W/404 (June 26, 2003). 
 96. Ministerial Declaration, supra note 91, at 2. Norway expressed the same view in the 
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to the debate, a group of developing countries submitted a checklist 
of issues to the TRIPS Council, containing three groups of questions 
(in a total of fourteen questions) on the meaning and scope of the 
Requirement.97 That proposal has been rejected by the delegations of 
the United States and Japan.98 That same group of developing 
countries detailed its proposal in two subsequent papers.99 The United 
States expressed their views on the inconvenience of the Requirement 
and proposed alternative solutions to the problem of erroneously 
granted patents.100 
IV. IN SEARCH OF A SOLUTION FOR ADOPTING THE REQUIREMENT 
WITHOUT UNDULY BURDENING THE PATENT SYSTEM AND/OR 
INFRINGING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. The TK Holder: A Co-Inventor? 
It has already been proposed that the best manner to address the 
issue of misappropriation of traditional knowledge and unauthorized 
access to genetic resources is to consider traditional knowledge 
TRIPS Council. See WTO Doc. IP/C/M/39 (Mar. 21, 2003), ¶ 120. 
 97. See The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD)—Checklist of Issues, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/420 (Mar. 2, 2004) 
(submission from Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Peru, Thailand and Venezuela). Subsequently, 
Bolivia joined the group. See The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge—Addendum. 
WTO Doc. IP/C/W/420/Add.1 (Mar. 5, 2004). 
 98. See TRIPS Council Zooms in on Disclosure Requirements, Bridges Trade BioRes, 
vol. 4 n.17 (Sept. 23, 2004), at http://www.ictsd.org/biores/04-09-23/story1.htm. 
  99. See Elements of the Obligation to Disclose the Source and Country of Origin of the 
Biological Resources and/or Traditional Knowledge Used in an Invention, WTO Doc. 
IP/C/W/429/Rev.1 (Sept. 27, 2004) (submission by Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Pakistan, 
Peru, Thailand, and Venezuela). Subsequently, Bolivia and Colombia requested to be added to 
the list of sponsors. WTO Docs. IP/C/W/429/Rev.1/Add.1 (Oct. 14, 2004), and Add.2 (Jan. 20, 
2005). See The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge—Elements of the Obligation to 
Disclose Evidence of Prior Informed Consent Under the Relevant National Regime, WTO Doc. 
IP/C/W/438 (Dec. 10, 2004). 
 100. See Article 27.3(b), Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/434 (Nov. 26, 2004). In 
a nutshell, the United States reaffirmed that the Requirement would not be cost-effective, for it 
would be too cumbersome and would not accomplish its purpose. Id. at 2–7. The United States 
proposed that erroneous patents could be avoided by resorting to prior art databases, the 
inequitable conduct doctrine and post-grant opposition or re-examination. Id. at 7–8. 
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holders as co-authors of inventions derived from genetic resources 
and/or associated traditional knowledge.101 Of course, when 
traditional knowledge holders inform bioprospectors of the results of 
their own inventive activity and those results are later claimed in a 
patent application, there is no doubt that the original inventors are 
entitled to be recognized as co-owners of the resulting patents 
(provided that the conditions of patentability are met). As one 
commentator explains: 
Patents for plant-derived drugs may be of three kinds: patents 
on the structure of the compound, patents on the process of 
isolation, and patents on specific uses of the drug. The 
contribution of indigenous knowledge may differ for each of 
these. For example, indigenous knowledge will have little 
contribution to patents on the structure of a compound, and, in 
many cases, patents on the process of isolation. Nevertheless, 
since the compound may very likely never have been isolated 
without knowledge of the existence of a particular plant and its 
importance in indigenous medicine, indigenous knowledge is 
still of critical importance in the identification and 
development of the drug. Where the use of the isolated drug is 
the same as, or very similar to, that of the source plant, it is 
clear that the contribution of indigenous knowledge has been 
essential to the development of the drug. On the other hand, 
where the use of the isolated compound as a drug diverges 
 101. Michael J. Huft, Comment, Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery Research: A 
Question of Intellectual Property Rights, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1678 (1995), says that “[i]t seems 
clear that there will be little difficulty in establishing the requisite level of collaboration to 
maintain joint inventorship in the development of plant-derived drugs using indigenous 
knowledge.” Id. at 1722; see also Anil K. Gupta, Rewarding Creativity for Conserving 
Diversity in [the] Third World: Can IPR Regimes Serve the Needs of Contemporary and 
Traditional Knowledge Experts in [the] Third World?, available at http://www.sristi.org/ 
pub/html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
Given the high hit rate in formal research around locally identified uses of plants and 
other kinds of biodiversity, transaction costs of formal R and D systems in private and 
public systems are reduced considerably. They should in turn share the benefits that 
may accrue from commercialization of so protected products. In some cases local 
communities or individuals as the case may be should be considered co-inventors of 
the new value added products. 
Id. at 4. 
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considerably from the use of the source plant in indigenous 
medicine, the contribution of indigenous knowledge is minimal 
at best.102 
The contribution of TK holders to patented inventions, therefore, 
takes two possible forms: they inform bioprospectors of the possible 
use of genetic resources (thus leading to the identification of useful 
bioactive components) and they supply samples of the genetic 
resources in question. 
Traditional knowledge holders are inventors of the uses of those 
bioactive components (even if they ignore their specific 
composition), where uses are sufficiently inventive.103 As inventors 
 102. Huft, supra note 101, at 1724 (note omitted). 
 103. An interesting discussion about the patentability of traditional uses of genetic 
resources can be found in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. H.N. Norton & Co. Ltd., [1996] 
R.P.C. 76: 
The Amazonian Indians have known for centuries that cinchona bark can be used to 
treat malarial and other fevers. They used it in the form of powdered bark. In 1820, 
French scientists discovered that the active ingredient, an alkaloid called quinine, 
could be extracted and used more effectively in the form of sulfate of quinine. In 1944, 
the structure of the alkaloid molecule (C20H24N2O2) was discovered. This meant that 
the substance could be synthesized. 
 Imagine a scientist telling an Amazonian Indian about the discoveries of 1820 and 
1944. He says: “We have found that the reason why the bark is good for fevers is that 
it contains an alkaloid with a rather complicated chemical structure which reacts with 
the red corpuscles in the bloodstream. It is called quinine” The Indian replies: “That is 
very interesting. In my tribe, we call it the magic spirit of the bark.” Does the Indian 
know about quinine? My Lords, under the description of a quality of the bark which 
makes it useful for treating fevers, he obviously does. I do not think it matters that he 
chooses to label it in animistic rather than chemical terms. He knows that the bark has 
a quality which makes it good for fever and that is one description of quinine. 
 On the other hand, in a different context, the Amazonian Indian would not know 
about quinine. If shown pills of quinine sulphate, he would not associate them with the 
cinchona bark. He does not know quinine under the description of a substance in the 
form of pills, and he certainly would not know about the artificially synthesised 
alkaloid . . . .  
 The quinine example shows that there are descriptions under which something may 
in a relevant sense be known without anyone being aware of its chemical composition 
or even that it has an identifiable molecular structure. This proposition is unaffected by 
whether the substance is natural or artificial. So far I have been considering what it 
means to know about something in ordinary everyday life. Do the same principles 
apply in the law of patents? Or does patent law have a specialised epistemology of its 
own? 
Id. at 88 (per Lord Hoffman). This text was quoted in Defensive Protection Measures Relating 
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(or co-inventors), and in accordance with internationally accepted 
principles of patent law, traditional knowledge holders could claim 
co-ownership in patents granted in any country that covered 
inventions derived from their inventive contributions.104 In other 
words, those who omit information on the inventive contribution of 
traditional knowledge holders in patent applications are in violation 
of patent law. There is no need for an additional requirement: the 
requirement already exists in Article 4ter of the Paris Convention. 
However, shamans who supply relevant, if not crucial, genetic 
material may provide important support for the activities of research 
and development of pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, 
but they are not co-inventors of the products and processes obtained 
as ultimate derivatives of those genetic resources. This issue was 
already addressed by U.S. courts in at least two cases: Moore v. 
Regents of the University of California105 and Regents of the 
University of California v. Synbiotics Corp.106 
In Moore, the Supreme Court of California held that the plaintiff, 
from whom the spleen had been extracted and the respective cells 
been used for medical research, which led to a patented cell line,107 
had a cause of action against the five defendants (the physician, the 
owners and operators of the University’s hospital, a researcher, a 
biotechnology institute and a pharmaceutical company) for breach of 
to Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge: An Update, at 7–8, 
WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/8 (Dec. 15, 2003). The judge, however, framed his argument 
as an element of novelty rather than of patentable subject matter. Actually, if a patent were 
granted for the use of chinchona bark (or quinine, for that matter) to treat malaria and other 
fevers, there would be no doubt that the Peruvian communities should be designated the rightful 
inventors. See generally MARK HONIGSBAUM, THE FEVER TRAIL—IN SEARCH OF THE CURE 
FOR MALARIA (Pan Books, 2002), which contains a very detailed and vivid account of how 
chinchona bark became a staple medicine in Europe. The book also tells about the adventures of 
European explorers in Peru and Bolivia who, in spite of local laws banning the unauthorized 
exportation of chinchona bark (in order to avoid the total depletion of the chinchona trees), took 
enormous risks to find and collect the precious natural medicine. 
 104. In many countries, uses (and in particular second uses of known substances) are not 
patentable subject matter if they do not consist of new, inventive and useful processes formed 
by a series of steps. See CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 
188–90. 
 105. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 106. 849 F. Supp. 740 (S.D. Cal. 1994). 
 107. Moore, 729 P.2d at 480–81. 
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the physician’s disclosure obligations, but not for conversion.108 One 
of the reasons that led the Court to refuse the allegation of conversion 
was that 
the subject matter of the Regent’s patent—the patented cell 
line and the products derived from it—cannot be Moore’s 
property. This is because the patented cell line is both factually 
and legally distinct from the cells taken from Moore’s body. 
Federal law permits the patenting of organisms that represent 
the product of “human ingenuity,” but not naturally occurring 
organisms. Human cell lines are patentable because “[l]ong-
term adaptation and growth of human tissues and cells in 
culture is difficult—often considered an art” . . . and the 
probability of success is low. It is this inventive effort that 
patent law rewards, not the discovery of naturally occurring 
raw materials.109 
 108. Id. at 497. Conversion, is “under tort and criminal law, the wrongful possession or 
disposition of another’s property as if it were one’s own; an act . . . of willful interference, 
without lawful justification, with any chattel in a manner inconsistent with another’s right, 
whereby that other person is deprived of the use of possession of the chattel.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 333 (7th ed. 1999). 
 109. Moore, 729 P.2d at 492–93 (citations omitted). In his dissent, Judge Mosk 
acknowledged that, as a matter of law, suppliers of materials cannot be seen as joint inventors 
because of the particular nature of their contributions. Id. at 512 (Mosk, J., dissenting). He 
suggested, however, that as an analogy, the plaintiff could be entitled to claim inventorship. “A 
patent is not a license to defraud,” he said. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
I am aware that “patients and research subjects who contribute cells to research will 
not be considered inventors.” Nor is such a person, strictly speaking, a “joint inventor” 
within the meaning of the term in federal law. But he does fall within the spirit of the 
law . . . . Although a patient who donates cells does not fit squarely within the 
definition of a joint inventor, the policy reasons that inform joint inventor patents 
should apply to cell donors. 
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The problem with Judge Mosk’s analogy is that 
patents are not certificates of fraud-free conduct. Patents have not been devised to certify that 
the inventor has a good character. They have been devised as certificates that someone with an 
inventive character (or with luck) has reached an inventive outcome. Furthermore, Judge 
Mosk’s analogy would create serious problems of proportionality: what proportion of the patent 
rights should go to those who contributed with the materials? If it is accepted that without them 
the invention would not have arisen, then they might be entitled to the whole patent (the 
understanding being that the uniqueness of the invention lied in the uniqueness of the 
material—therefore, any other scientist might very well, if in possession of the same material, 
develop a similar invention). Judge Mosk, ultimately, was proposing a complete reformulation 
of the patent system, so that all sorts of contributions, in addition to the inventive contributions, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p111 Carvalho book pages.doc  4/11/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
150 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 17:111 
 
 
 
In Synbiotics, the owner of several cats that were showing some 
particular symptoms, took them, along with her written observations 
on the cats’ symptoms, to be blood tested.110 From the blood samples, 
scientists were able to isolate the virus (similar to the human AIDS 
virus), and subsequently filed for and obtained two patents.111 The 
district judge refused to see an inventive nature in the act of bringing 
the cats and calling the scientists’ attention to the cats’ symptoms.112 
Because gene- and chemical-related inventions are conceived only 
when the inventor “has reduced the invention to practice through a 
successful experiment,” the cats’ owner could not be seen as an 
inventor.113 “As a matter of law,” the court said, “only those persons 
who contributed to the acts and events that resulted in the conception 
and reduction to practice are properly considered the inventors of the 
patents.”114 And because the cats’ owner had neither been present, 
nor participated in any way in the events of identifying and isolating 
the virus, she was not a co-inventor.115 
The same reasoning can be applied to most (but not to all) TK 
holders’ contributions to patented inventions. Their contributions 
generally consist of indicating a specific use of a specific resource, or 
of samples of the material. Based on that information, researchers 
will be able: to identify the bioactive ingredient that causes the 
positive action identified by the TK holder; to assess and describe the 
properties of that ingredient; to isolate and to purify that ingredient 
(and, eventually to synthesize it); and to transform it into a final 
are recognized. Stretching his reasoning, where an inventor failed to pay the rent of the 
premises where he did his research, the landlord might as well ask for a share in the ownership 
of the invention. The only manner to overcome that uncertainty would be to follow the example 
of some provisions that deal with employees’ inventions, which attribute a pre-determined, 
arbitrary proportion of proprietary interests to employers when inventions are made by 
employees not hired to invent and who used the employers’ data, experience, and resources. See 
infra Part IV.E. However, contrary to Judge Mosk’s view, this solution is not about 
inventorship but rather about ownership.  Purely material contributions can never give rise to 
claims of inventorship.  
 110. Synbiotics, 849 F. Supp. at 742. 
 111. Id. at 741. 
 112. Id. at 742. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. Because she was not a co-inventor, she had no vested rights in the patent title, and 
therefore, she had no standing for licensing the patents to a third party—which was actually a 
patent infringer, not a patent licensee. 
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product. Obviously, the TK holder has not participated in any of 
these activities. Therefore, he is not one of the inventors.116 The 
provision of resources, as crucial as they may be for the inventive 
output, is not inventive per se. 
Therefore, where the TK holder’s contribution consisted in 
handing over genetic resources and/or indicating their utility, the 
Requirement is not relevant for detecting inventorship of claims that 
are not limited to uses. It seeks only to establish a contractual interest 
in the commercial gains of an invention derived from genetic 
resources, in the event these resources have been extracted from a 
territory where there is a duty to obtain formal consent in order to 
have legitimate access. The Requirement, under those circumstances, 
is not ancillary to patent law—it is ancillary to administrative and/or 
contract law. 
B. Non-Statutory Standards and the Duty of Disclosure: Unjust 
Enrichment and Uninformed Consent 
Because inventions derived from traditional knowledge do rely on 
contributions from TK holders, either in the form of knowledge or in 
the form of materials, or both, one could allege that the patent 
applicants are, directly or indirectly, benefiting from those 
contributions; therefore, they are being unjustly enriched if no 
recognition is given to the contributors. However, under current 
standards of international law, knowledge that is not claimed in the 
form of a patent application becomes a matter of public domain, and, 
in the absence of effective measures aimed at keeping it secret, no 
claim can be made as to ownership. Unpatented and disclosed ideas 
are free to circulate and be used without any restriction—this is the 
core of the patent and trade secret systems. Thus, in the absence of a 
 116. But, on the other hand, based on that same information, researchers may have tested 
and confirmed that the resource (or a bioactive ingredient in the resource) had effective results 
when used in the manner indicated by the TK holder (such as the use of a plant as an antibiotic). 
If a patent is applied for the use of that ingredient, the TK holder may rightfully claim that he is 
indeed an inventor (or a joint inventor, if the researchers have generated some additional 
concept to the TK holder’s original invention), because in this event he was indeed the person 
who conceived the technical solution for the problem. But when the TK holder is the true 
inventor, he should be identified as such under current patent law. The Requirement, therefore, 
does not create a new obligation in this narrow sense. 
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special statutory provision obliging patent applicants to inform patent 
offices of the use of traditional knowledge either as a lead or as a 
component of the claimed invention, courts may hesitate to recognize 
traditional knowledge holders’ legal standing to claim compensation 
for misappropriation of or unjust enrichment from their unpatented 
and disclosed knowledge. Let us take the following hypothetical 
example: a bioprospector obtains information from a shaman on the 
medicinal use of a given genetic resource; the bioprospector may then 
buy some samples of that resource from the shaman or may receive 
them as a gift, and, back in a developed country, sells the information 
and the collected samples to a pharmaceutical company. Guided by 
such information, the company identifies a bioactive component in 
the resource, discovers its useful properties and develops such 
information into a final product several years later. Eventually, the 
company obtains a patent on the isolated and purified bioactive 
component as well as on its use. The company also obtains marketing 
approval from the health authorities and starts commercializing the 
drug. 
As discussed above, we have here two different situations: when 
the patent is obtained on the isolated and purified component, the 
shaman has supplied information and samples of the genetic 
resources, and in exchange he has received no remuneration at all or, 
at most, a very small amount of money, which eventually (and 
frequently) is not proportionate to the potential economic value of the 
information and materials provided; but when the patent is obtained 
on the use of a bioactive component, the shaman is indeed an 
inventor or co-inventor, because he (or one of his ancestors) was the 
person who created the mental concept of the solution for the 
technical problem (the problem was a certain illness and the solution 
was the use of the bioactive compound to combat the illness or its 
symptoms). This second situation is already dealt with by patent law, 
and the following discussion will not cover it. The difficulty lies in 
the first situation (in the absence, of course, and as noted, of a special 
statute). As seen before,117 the shaman cannot be deemed a co-
inventor, regardless of the importance of the raw material to the final 
 117. See supra Part IV.A. 
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inventive output. His contribution concerned raw material in which 
no inventive concept was embodied—or, if it was (for example, the 
breeding work that made it possible for the genetic material to 
acquire (or enhance) the properties in question), it did not have any 
influence whatsoever on the inventive work of isolating and purifying 
the compound. The shaman’s contribution to the invention, therefore, 
was not of an intellectual nature. 
The problem is whether the shaman can allege that the 
bioprospector had failed to disclose to him the potential or actual 
value of the genetic resource (and the associated element of 
traditional knowledge, which consists of the discovery of the 
resource’s bioactive properties). Otherwise he would have requested 
an increased payment (or, eventually, a share in the commercial gains 
derived from the final output). Is the bioprospector, and his/her 
successors (eventually, the pharmaceutical company), liable for 
fraudulent concealment? Does the bioprospector (or the company) 
have a duty to disclose information to the shaman on the effective or 
potential value of his TK? Is the bioprospector, therefore, liable in the 
event that he/she fails to do so? If the answer is yes, traditional 
knowledge holders may have standing to ask U.S. courts to make 
biosquatters accountable for concealment. 
The controlling case is Laidlaw v. Organ,118 where the Supreme 
Court held that the buyer did not have the duty of disclosing to the 
seller of tobacco the news that a treaty of peace had been signed at 
Ghent between England and the United States, which caused the 
value of tobacco to rise “from 30 to 50 percent.”119 Justice Marshall 
wrote: 
The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of 
extrinsic circumstances, which might influence the price of the 
commodity, and which was exclusively within the knowledge 
of the vendee, ought to have been communicated by him to the 
vendor? The court is of opinion that he was not bound to 
communicate it. It would be difficult to circumscribe the 
contrary doctrine within proper limits, where the means of 
 118. 15 U.S. 178 (1817). 
 119. Id. at 183. 
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intelligence are equally accessible to both parties. But at the 
same time, each party must take care not to say or do any thing 
tending to impose upon the other.120 
If we extrapolate this holding into the contractual relationship 
between the bioprospector and the shaman, we will notice that: (1) 
most probably the bioprospector is not aware of the real value of the 
genetic resource; the information he/she controls is that eventually 
the genetic resource shown to him/her by the shaman has potential 
pharmacological value, but ultimately such a value will be assessed 
several years later, after much research and testing; anyway, that is 
already a piece of information that the shaman did not know; 
therefore, that is not a situation “where the means of intelligence are 
equally accessible to both parties,” in the words of Justice Marshall; 
(2) the increased value of the genetic resource (as compared to the 
value the shaman thinks it has) is both intrinsic and extrinsic to it—it 
is intrinsic to the extent that it is a medicinal bioactive component of 
the resource that adds value to it; and it is extrinsic to the extent that 
the firm’s activities of screening, researching, isolating, purifying and 
testing the pharmaceutical product, not to mention the FDA’s 
administrative act of granting marketing approval, are the factors that 
increase the resource’s commercial value; (3) the bioprospector’s 
failure in disclosing to the shaman what he already knows about the 
resource’s potential value can be deemed a misrepresentation by 
silence121 and the failure in informing the shaman of the increased 
value as a result of the downstream activities carried out by the 
pharmaceutical firm could eventually be seen as continuing 
misrepresentation.122 
Keeton explains that the law after Laidlaw was expanded and that 
the buyer has no duty to disclose to the vendor circumstances that 
make the property much more valuable, “and this is true regardless of 
whether the fact concealed is extrinsic or intrinsic.”123 
 120. Id. at 195. 
 121. See W. Page Keeton, Fraud—Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1937). 
 122. Id. at 6. 
 123. Id. at 21. Keeton exemplifies with several cases holding that a purchaser of real estate 
who is aware of the existence of valuable mineral ores underlying the property has not the duty 
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One might argue that this is an unfair rule, to the extent that it 
preserves a situation of unequal information and power between the 
contracting parties. But, as Keeton suggests, “the law cannot hope to 
put all parties to every contract on an equality as to knowledge, 
experience, skill and shrewdness; even if it could, would such be a 
just and equitable law?”124 The point is that there is no economic 
efficiency in promoting negligence and laziness, and, on the contrary, 
there is economic efficiency in rewarding those who diligently pursue 
information and knowledge. “It is pointed out,” Keeton said, “that 
[the duty to disclose information to an indolent vendor] is neither just 
to the individual nor is it a wise social policy to follow because it 
tends to discourage industry and training.”125 
Based on this argument, Kronman crafted the theory that where 
the individual obtains information as a result of deliberate efforts, 
such information should be considered the subject matter of property 
rights.126 Therefore, and whereas “[t]he only feasible way of 
assigning property rights in short-lived market information is to 
permit those with such information to contract freely without 
disclosing what they know,”127 the bioprospector should be allowed 
to conceal the information about the intrinsic value of the genetic 
resource and associated TK from the shaman. The reason for 
distinguishing between knowledge that has been deliberately 
acquired by the bioprospector (or his/her employer—the 
pharmaceutical company) and knowledge that has been acquired 
casually is that denying protection to the latter “will have no 
significant effect on his future behavior. Since one who casually 
acquires information makes no investment in its acquisition, 
subjecting him to a duty to disclose is not likely to reduce the amount 
of socially useful information which he actually generates.”128 
to disclose such information to the seller, even when he is aware that the seller is not in 
possession of such information. Id. at 22. 
 124. Id. at 22–23. 
 125. Id. at 23. 
 126. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1978). 
 127. Id. at 15. 
 128. Id. at 15–16. 
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Under Kronman’s approach, therefore, the duty to disclose 
information on the value of the genetic resource would take place 
only where genetic resource collection is random or 
ethnobotanical,129 and when the bioprospector is actually in 
possession of such information, which most frequently he is not. In 
contrast, taxonomic collection would never be subject to the duty of 
disclosure, because taxonomic collection is deliberate and targeted, 
which leads to the presumption that knowledge about the value of the 
collected genetic resources has been previously acquired. 
Another commentator, with the same purpose of fostering 
acquisition of socially useful information, stretched Kronman’s idea 
and proposed that doctors and biotechnology firms should be allowed 
to lie to patients who contribute with materials extracted from their 
own bodies.130 Accordingly, bioprospectors should not only be 
allowed to conceal information for taxonomic collection of genetic 
resources: they should also be allowed to lie, if asked by the shaman 
about their intentions as to the utilization of the resources. 
 129. James Miller says that there exist three strategies for collecting plants for screening 
programs: random, taxonomic and ethnobotanical. See James S. Miller & Stephen J. Brewer, 
The Discovery of Medicines and Forest Conservation, in CONSERVATION OF PLANT GENES 122 
(Acad. Press, 1992). “Random collecting is an attempt to sample as much taxonomic diversity 
as possible.” Id. One limitation of random collecting “is that it often yields samples that are 
often taxonomically biased by the geographical restriction of collecting.” Id. “Taxonomic 
collecting is based on the general tendency . . . for related taxa to contain related compounds.” 
Id. at 123. And ethnobotanical collecting consists of selecting the plants to be collected based 
on their use by traditional medicine. Id. The use of ethnobotanical data may be applied in the 
study of the use of plants in traditional medicine, followed by a testing of their effectiveness. It 
also may be used for random screening of plants “used in traditional medicine on the 
assumption that they have a higher probability of yielding bioactive compounds.” Id. 
 130. See Robert Heidt, Maintaining Incentives for Bioprospecting: The Occasional Need 
for a Right to Lie, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 667–720 (1998). Bioprospecting, in Heidt’s 
comment, means “the search for valuable cells.” Id. at 667. Heidt addresses a single situation: a 
doctor extracts some material from the body of one of his patients, and he/she finds some 
interesting and potentially valuable properties in some cells. But because the cells did not resist 
the tests and perished, the doctor needs to obtain additional material. Heidt suggests that the 
doctor should not only be entitled to omit that information to the patient (which would have 
Kronman’s assent), but also, if asked by the patient, he should also be allowed to lie about the 
real value of the cells. Id. at 670. For a general discussion about how patent law applies to 
collection of human genetic material, see generally Cynthia M. Ho, Who Deserves the Patent 
Pot of Gold?: An Inquiry into the Proper Inventorship of Patient-Based Discoveries, HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 107 (2002). 
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Keeton, however, notes that courts tend to include non-economic 
factors in their analysis of contractual relationships where differences 
in knowledge may lead to misinformed consent, or mistakes: 
In the present stage of the law, the decisions show a drawing 
away from this idea [that law is concerned with freedom of 
contract, not with morals], and there can be seen an attempt by 
many courts to reach a just result in so far as possible, but yet 
maintaining the degree of certainty which the law must have. 
The statement must often be found that if either party to a 
contract of sale conceals or suppresses a material fact which he 
is in good faith bound to disclose then his silence is fraudulent. 
[I]t would seem that the object of the law in these cases should 
be to impose on parties to the transaction a duty to speak 
whenever justice, equity, and fair dealing demand it. This 
statement is made only with reference to instances where the 
party to be charged is an actor in the transaction. This duty to 
speak does not result from an implied representation by 
silence, but exists because a refusal to speak constitutes unfair 
conduct.131 
It is possible that a shaman may persuade a U.S. court to 
determine that a biosquatter and/or his successors must compensate 
the shaman for the omission in informing him of the real or potential 
value of a genetic resource and/or associated TK, so as to enable the 
shaman to request a review of the amounts paid (and eventually, 
 131. Keeton, supra note 121, at 31 (citations omitted). Given that this issue involves 
fairness, and in the absence of a rule of mathematical precision to dispose of all situations, 
Keeton lists nine items to be checked so as to assess whether there is or is not a duty to disclose, 
such as the difference in degree of intelligence of the parties to the transaction, the manner in 
which the information is acquired, the general class to which the person who conceals the 
information belongs, the materiality of the fact not disclosed and the conduct of the person with 
knowledge of the non disclosed fact. Id. at 33–37. In the light of some of those items, the 
bioprospector would not be blamed for concealing information from the TK holder. But other 
items, in Keeton’s view, would clearly speak in favor of the TK holder and against the 
bioprospector and his successors. It should be noted that Keeton’s reasoning may also apply to 
differences in levels of information between a prospector and a government that supplies a 
certain genetic resource. However, in this case, the issue at stake would not be one of difference 
in knowledge, for the genetic resource is not knowledge in itself, but one of prospective or 
actual gains derived from a material contribution by the government. 
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where it may make economic sense, a rescission of the contract).132 
This has nothing to do, however, with patent law. What the shaman 
may complain about is the lack of transparency or candor by the 
bioprospector. The fact that a patent application does not disclose any 
element that may help the shaman assess the real value of the 
information he had provided may simply constitute an additional 
element for persuading the judge that the bioprospector has acted in 
bad faith. But the breach of the shaman’s right to be informed and the 
act of misappropriation and fraudulent concealment took place at the 
moment the bioprospector received the material (and/or the 
information on its traditional use) from the TK holder. 
C. Revisiting the Unclean Hands Doctrine 
When traditional knowledge is used, directly or indirectly, as a 
basis for creating inventive uses for genetic resources to which they 
are associated, and where those inventions become the subject matter 
of patents, society has two ways to deal with the need for ensuring 
the sharing of eventual benefits arising from those inventions with 
TK holders: one is to adopt the Requirement as a condition of 
patentability; the other is to adopt the unclean hands doctrine. 
I have proposed elsewhere that governments could resort to the 
unclean hands doctrine as an alternative to adopting the Requirement 
as a condition of patentability: 
[C]ourts should be able to sanction the lack of candor of patent 
applicants who knowingly failed to disclose the source in a 
manner that would facilitate benefit sharing, as established by 
article 15 of the CBD. Actually, the determination that the 
concealment of information might lead to the implementation 
of public policies concerning benefit sharing is fraudulent is a 
matter of law. Consequently, any attempt to enforce patent 
 132. Actually, some transfers of genetic material do require a continued supply. This is 
particularly true in the cosmetics and perfume industry, where synthetic materials are never as 
efficient as the natural ones. But in the pharmaceutical sector the same circumstances may also 
arise. For example, it has been reported that efforts to successfully synthesize taxol are still 
undergoing. The use of the bark of the Pacific yew to produce the anti-cancer drug has put 
serious strain in the tree’s population. See Pacific Yew: The Taxol Story, Canadian Forest 
Service, at http://www.pfc.forestry.ca/ecology/yew/taxol_e.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
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rights thus obtained would be an abuse of rights. In compliance 
with paragraph 2 of article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and 
given that infringement both direct and contributory is a tort, it 
can be imposed that one must have clean hands to obtain relief 
from an equity court. Only after a patentee abandons its 
unlawful practice and the effects of the misuse are completely 
dissipated may it sue infringers. In the case of the 
Requirement, this implies that patent owners would have to 
disclose the origin and obtain the appropriate authorizations 
from the appropriate stakeholders (governments, local 
authorities, and traditional knowledge holders) before the 
patent rights could be enforced against infringers. 
 In sum, the national or regional laws of WTO members that 
restrict access to the genetic resources found in their territory 
may require that patent applicants indicate, if known, the 
source of genetic resources directly or indirectly used in 
obtaining the invention. The lack of that indication by a patent 
applicant who knew or had reason to know constitutes fraud. 
Therefore, the enforcement of the resulting patent therefore, 
may be deemed an abuse of rights. 
 In the same vein, if one obtains the genetic resource directly 
or indirectly used in making a patented invention in a country 
that has adopted legislation requiring prior informed consent, 
the failure to obtain that consent constitutes fraud and, 
therefore, an attempt to enforce that patent may be deemed an 
abuse of rights. In both cases the patentee’s cleaning his hands 
by providing the missing information and/or obtaining the 
required prior consent, would purge the abuse of rights. 
 Importantly, this proposal would not raise transaction costs 
to an unacceptable level, making patents ineffective. The sort 
of care required from patent applicants would be reasonable 
under the circumstances. They would be required to indicate 
the origin of the resources that they knew or that they had a 
reason to know—this is a reasonable care standard. In many 
cases, mere evidence of compliance with the national laws of 
the countries providing the genetic resources would suffice, 
without imposing on the patent applicants the burden of 
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engaging in complicated and costly investigative efforts. On 
the other hand, infringers would not be able to get away with 
illegal practices because the burden of proving the failure by 
the patent owner to meet the reasonable care standard would 
fall upon them. If they provided no evidence, no defense would 
exist against the patent owner. Nevertheless, as explained 
before, that standard would not be impossible to meet 
particularly where the countries of origin had enacted laws on 
access to genetic resources. In these cases, assessing whether 
the patent owner met the standard would be almost a matter of 
objective fact finding.133 
The use of the unclean hands doctrine would have advantages 
over the patentability condition approach: 
(1) first, as a rule of enforcement, it would be compatible with the 
different international treaties mentioned above (namely the TRIPS 
Agreement, the UPOV Convention, the PCT and the PLT); several of 
the arguments listed in paragraph 29.74 supra indicate that such a 
rule would be fair for the purposes of Article 41.2 of the TRIPS 
Agreement; 
(2) second, it would not affect the patentability of an invention. 
Actually, the idea proposed does not resort to the inequitable conduct 
rule, because inequitable conduct can only be alleged when the patent 
applicant fails to disclose to the patent office some material fact that 
may be (or probably is) material to the patentability; therefore, 
inequitable conduct, like the Requirement, is linked to the conditions 
of patentability. The inequitable conduct may also lead to the partial 
or total unenforceability of the patent, but, unlike the unclean hands 
doctrine, it cannot be purged.134 To this extent, the idea of permitting 
the biosquatter to clean his/her hands is a mitigated inequitable 
conduct approach. However, when the claims contain matter that is 
 133. See Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources 
and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications without Infringing the TRIPS Agreement, 2 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 371, 399–400 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 134. For an overview of recent cases on the inequitable conduct doctrine, see Lisa A. 
Dolak, The Inequitable Conduct Doctrine: Lessons from Recent Cases, 84 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 719, 723–40 (2002). As noted above, the inequitable conduct doctrine 
has been identified by the United States as an alternative solution to prevent the granting of 
patents that claim previously disclosed TK. See supra note 100.  
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traditional knowledge (such as the turmeric patent135), the obligation 
to disclose it is already clearly established by patent law. Likewise, 
when the origin of a genetic resource is relevant for enabling an 
appropriate description of the invention, applicants are already under 
the obligation to disclose it in the specifications.136 In those two 
circumstances, failure to inform the patent examiner about those facts 
amounts to concealing elements of material importance for the 
assessment of the patentability. Those would be grounds for a finding 
of irremediable inequitable conduct. 
(3) third, the unclean hands doctrine does indeed promote benefit 
sharing because it surprises the patent owner at the moment he/she is 
using the court authority to collect revenue from an infringer (in the 
form of damages) and/or to impose his/her exclusive rights (and 
maintain his/her position as exclusive user of the invention in the 
market by means of an injunction). Because the court will refuse to 
do so until the patent owner cleans his/her hands, the patent owner 
has no solution other than seeking a settlement with both the supplier 
of the genetic resources and the licensor of the associated TK.  
One commentator has already discussed this point in relation to 
the collection of human material from patients. Commenting on 
Judge Mosk’s dissent in Moore, she wrote: 
[I]n the case of failing to disclose patient contributions, unless 
the law changes with respect to whether patients can jointly 
conceive of an invention, failure to disclose the identity of 
patients, or even their contributions, would not rise to the level 
of material information for patentability purposes. Although 
patients believe that but for their actions, no patentable 
invention would have been conceived in the first instance, this 
information is not material to whether the ultimate invention is 
patentable. In addition, allowing information that is not 
material to the patentability analysis to be the basis for 
inequitable conduct runs counter to the traditional basis for 
such unenforceability . . . .  
 135. See supra note 17. 
 136. Several countries, in their responses to the WIPO questionnaire on the Requirement, 
have noted that aspect. See Draft Study, supra note 16, ¶¶ 57–64. 
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 In addition, even if the patent laws were amended to make 
patents unenforceable if patient contributions were not 
properly disclosed to the patent office, it is unclear whether 
this would be an optimal approach. In particular, for patients 
who want to share of patent profits, creating a new rule for 
unenforceability would negate any such hope of profits. 
Nonetheless, if patients cannot be considered joint inventors, 
an unenforceability rule might provide a helpful bargaining 
platform for some patients. Accordingly, perhaps patients 
should advocate a new patent rule requiring all patent 
applicants to disclose the extent of patient contributions to the 
invention, as well as what compensation, if any, has been 
provided for such contributions.137  
The inequitable conduct, like the Requirement (if adopted as a 
condition of patentability), seriously reduces the possibility of the TK 
holder to share benefits. Of course, it is not because the patent will 
become unenforceable that the inventor will completely cease to 
obtain gains from its exploitation. A patent is not a sine qua non of 
commercial success. Nor does the inventor cease commercially 
exploiting it once it is lost or expired. We can think of a very long list 
of inventions that continued being profitably exploited by their 
inventors after the expiration of the respective patents. Besides, as 
explained above, the obligation to share benefits under Article 15.7 
does not necessarily stem from their commercial utilization. Their use 
for scientific or technological purposes is already sufficient ground to 
trigger benefit sharing—even though, in the absence of commercial 
gains, it may become very difficult to evaluate those benefits. 
Nonetheless, the expiration of the patent (or the lapse of the rights to 
enforce it) reduces the patentee’s capacity of reaping the fruit of a 
commercially successful invention because nothing will prevent 
others from doing the same—and consequently it undermines the 
patentee’s financial capacity of sharing benefits. 
 137. Cynthia Ho, supra note 130, at 155–56. The commentator describes a situation that is 
almost exclusive to U.S. law. In most countries patents cannot be granted on cells, cell lines, 
genes, or gene sequences, if of human origin. See Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b)—
Illustrative List of Questions, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/273/Rev.1 (Feb. 18, 2003). 
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The unclean hands doctrine approach has the advantage that it 
does not affect the enforceability of the patent—it just suspends it 
until the patent owner cleans his/her hands.138 
D. The Duty to Disclose Relevant Material Interests in Patent 
Applications; The Example of the Government Funding Disclosure 
Clause of 35 U.S.C. § 202. 
In 1999, the WIPO Secretariat included the following question in 
a questionnaire on WIPO Member States’ practices related to the 
protection of biotechnological inventions: 
Does your legislation include any special provisions to ensure 
the recording of contributions to inventions (such as the source 
of government funding, the source of genetic resources that 
originate or are employed in biotechnological inventions, the 
grant of prior informed consent to have access to those 
resources)?139 
The question was deliberately drafted so as to imply that the 
requirement to identify the origin of genetic resources, then adopted 
only by Costa Rica and the Andean Community, and the obligation to 
inform about the use of government funding, as imposed by the 
United States Code, are similar. Indeed, they are similar to the extent 
that both are formal requirements because they concern the manner in 
 138. See MANUEL RUIZ, SOUTH CENTRE, THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE ON TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE AS PRIOR ART IN THE PATENT SYSTEM (Oct. 2002), available at 
www.southcentre.org/publications/occasional/paper09/traditionalknowledge.pdf; COMMISSION 
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 86–87 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/ 
pdfs/final_report/ciprfullfinal.pdf. 
 139. Actually this question was originated by the debate in the SCP on the Colombian 
proposal. Because of that proposal, Colombia was invited to attend the meeting of the WIPO 
Working Group on Biotechnology, in November 1999. See Issues for Proposed Work Program 
on Biotechnology, WIPO Doc. WIPO/BIOT/WG/99/1 (Oct. 28, 1999) (on file with the WIPO 
Secretariat). The responses to the questionnaire were collected and circulated and submitted to 
the WIPO Meeting on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources of April 17 and 18, 2000 
(Information Provided by WIPO Member States Concerning Special Provisions to Ensure the 
Recording of Some Contributions to Inventions, WIPO Doc. WIPO/IP/GR/00/3 Rev.1 (Apr. 14, 
2000))—the meeting that was the precursor of the Intergovernmental Committee. The same 
responses can also be found in WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/6 (Apr. 6, 2000), submitted to 
the first session of the Committee, from April 30 to May 3, 2001.  
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which the claimed invention is described, and thus they do not regard 
the nature of the invention. Both requirements are, therefore, extrinsic 
to the invention. But the similarity stops there. As it will be shown, 
unlike the Requirement, the U.S. requirement that contractors inform 
about government funding is consistent with international 
obligations, including those of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Contractors, under 35 U.S.C. § 202,140 have actually two 
disclosure obligations: they must disclose the very existence of the 
 140. The relevant provisions of Chapter 18 (“Patent Rights in Inventions Made with 
Federal Assistance”), 35 U.S.C. § 202 et seq. read: 
35 U.S.C. § 202 Disposition of rights 
(a) Each nonprofit organization or small business firm may, within a reasonable time 
after disclosure as required by paragraph (c)(1) of this section, elect to retain title to 
any subject invention . . . The rights of the nonprofit organization or small business 
firm shall be subject to the provisions of paragraph (c) of this section and the other 
provisions of this chapter . . . .  
(c) Each funding agreement with a small business firm or nonprofit organization shall 
contain appropriate provisions to effectuate the following: 
(1) That the contractor disclose each subject invention to the Federal agency within a 
reasonable time after it becomes known to a contractor personnel responsible for the 
administration of patent matters, and that the Federal Government may receive title to 
any subject invention not disclosed to it within such time . . . .  
(4) With respect to any invention in which the contractor elects rights, the federal 
agency shall have a nonexclusive, non-transferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to 
practice or have practiced for on or behalf of the United States any subject invention 
throughout the world: Provided, That the funding agreement may provide for such 
additional rights; including the right to assign or have assigned foreign patent rights in 
the subject invention, as are determined by the agency . . . .  
(6) An obligation on the part of the contractor, in the event a United States patent 
application is filed by or on its behalf or by any assignee of the contractor, to include 
within the specification of such application and any patent issuing thereon, a statement 
specifying that the invention was made with Government support and that the 
Government has certain rights in the invention . . . .  
35 U.S.C. § 203 March-in rights 
(1) With respect to any subject invention in which a small business firm or nonprofit 
organization has acquired title under this chapter, the Federal agency under whose 
funding agreement the subject invention was made shall have the right . . . to require 
the contractor, an assignee, or exclusive licensee of a subject invention to grant a 
nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive license in any field of use to a 
responsible applicant or applicants, upon terms that are reasonable under the 
circumstances, and if the contractor, assignee, or exclusive licensee refuses such 
request, to grant such a license itself . . . .  
35 U.S.C. § 206 Uniform clauses and regulations 
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The Secretary of Commerce may issue regulations which may be made applicable to 
federal agencies implementing the provisions of sections 202 through 204 of this 
chapter . . . .  
Those regulations can be found in 37 C.F.R. § 401 (2004), and in particular in the following 
rules: 
§ 401.3 Use of standard clauses at § 401.14. 
(a) Each funding agreement awarded to a small business firm or nonprofit organization 
. . . shall contain the clause found in § 401.14(a) . . . .  
§ 401.14 Standard patent rights clauses. 
(a) The following is the standard patent rights clause to be used as specified in 
§ 401.3(a). 
Patent rights (Small Business Firms and Nonprofit Organizations) . . .  
(b) Allocation of Principal Rights 
The Contractor may retain the entire right, title, and interest throughout the world to 
each subject invention subject to the provisions of this clause and 35 U.S.C. § 203. 
With respect to any subject invention in which the Contractor retains title, the Federal 
government shall have a non-exclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license 
to practice or have practiced for on or behalf of the United States the subject invention 
throughout the world. 
(c) Invention Disclosure, Election of Title and Filing of Patent Application by 
Contractor 
(1) The contractor will disclose each subject invention to the Federal Agency within 
two months after the inventor discloses it in writing to contractor personnel 
responsible for patent matters . . . .  
(2) The contractor will elect in writing whether or not to retain title to any such 
invention by notifying the Federal Agency . . . .  
(d) Conditions When the Government May Obtain Title 
The contractor will convey to the Federal Agency, upon written request, title to any 
subject invention — 
(1) If the contractor fails to disclose or elect title to the subject invention within the 
times specified in (c) above, or elects not to retain title; provided that the agency may 
only request title within 60 days after learning of the failure of the contractor to 
disclose or elect with the specified times . . . .  
(f) Contractor Action to Protect the Government’s Interest . . . .  
(4) The contractor agrees to include, within the specification of any United States 
patent applications and any patent issuing thereon covering a subject invention, the 
following statement, “This invention was made with government support under 
(identify the contract) awarded by (identify the Federal agency). The government has 
certain rights in the invention.” 
The provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 202 et seq. apply to all firms regardless of their size, in 
accordance with Presidential Executive Order 12,591. It should be noted that, because the 
march-in rights, under 35 U.S.C. § 203, amount to a compulsory license, they are subject to the 
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subject inventions to the funding agency; and they must inform that 
the subject invention was made under a funding agreement in the 
patent application.141 If the contractor fails to disclose the invention 
to the funding Agency, the Government may acquire title to the 
invention. Such an acquisition, however, is not automatic—“the 
agency may only request title within 60 days of learning of the failure 
to disclose or elect within the specified times.”142 And because the 
provision says that the Government may request title, it follows that 
such a request depends on the discretionary authority of the 
governmental agency. 
The purpose of the government funding requirement (hereinafter 
designated as “the U.S. requirement”) is two-fold. On the one hand, it 
is aimed at informing the government itself about the existence of the 
invention, because the fact that the invention was publicly funded 
gives the government some rights in the invention, namely the right 
to a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable and paid-up license.143 
On the other hand, the requirement provides information to the public 
at large, because, if some circumstances of public interest arise, the 
government has march-in rights in the invention, which means that 
interested third parties may eventually obtain the right to use the 
patented invention.144 However, the notice on the patent letter that the 
invention was made with Federal financial assistance is “neutral” in 
the sense that the actual rights that the government may have 
reserved are not specified thereon.145 
provisions of article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Therefore, the possibility for the U.S. 
government to grant “partially exclusive, or exclusive” compulsory licenses is inconsistent with 
article 31(d) of the TRIPS Agreement, which provides that compulsory licenses “shall be non-
exclusive.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 31. 
 141. Section 302(c)(6) states that the funding agreement shall contain the obligation “on 
the part of the contractor . . . to include within the specification of such application and any 
patent issuing thereon, a statement specifying that the invention was made with Government 
support.” Evidently, the second aspect of this provision is beyond the contractor’s control. Only 
the Unites States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) can implement the obligation of 
including a certain language in the patent. The only thing the patent applicant can do is to 
inform the USPTO of the interests of the federal government in a given patent application and 
to request a correction if the patent is issued without such a note. 
 142. 37 CFR § 401.14(a)(d)(1) (2004) 
 143. 35 U.S.C.S. § 202(c)(4) (2004); Exec. Order No. 12, 591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (1987). 
 144. 35 U.S.C.S. § 203 (2004). 
 145. “The only concrete evidence Duke cites is the statement on each of the patents noting 
that the government has rights in the patents. This, however, is insufficient because these short 
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Secondly, § 202 et seq. do not provide for any mandatory action 
to be taken by Federal agencies. They contain no standards for courts 
to use to examine legality.146  
Another important aspect of Chapter 18 is that its provisions do 
not set a clear entitlement to patent rights. “Though the indication is 
strong,” said the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 
Southern Research Institute v. Griffin Corp.,147 “that the government 
should ordinarily grant such [patent] rights, the statute admits of no 
considerations by which we could fairly gauge the propriety of a 
refusal to so grant such rights.”148 In a footnote the court noted that 
commentators had suggested that the Bayh-Dole Act149 created a 
presumption in favor of researchers working with a government 
funding grant. The court, however, repeated: “[w]hile we may not 
disagree with this view, we note that the Act leaves us without 
sufficient judicial standards by which to evaluate a refusal to give 
away patent rights.”150  
What is then the consequence of failure to comply with the 
government funding disclosure requirement—or more specifically, 
what happens if the contractor fails to acknowledge in the patent 
application that the invention was made with public financial 
assistance? It seems that, according to courts, the consequence 
ultimately lies in the discretionary authority of the government, 
provided the deadlines established by 37 C.F.R § 401.14 are 
notations on the patents do not define the scope of the government’s rights.” Madey v. Duke 
Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 146. “The court held that Vartanian’s complaint must be dismissed because (1) § 202 did 
not provide, either explicitly or implicitly, a private right of action regarding the ownership of 
inventions; (2) judicial review of the agency’s purported refusal to grant ownership rights was 
unavailable . . . because the underlying statute, § 202, does not provide any standards for 
meaningful review of the agency’s actions . . . . We also agree with the court that judicial 
review is not available because the underlying statute, § 202, provides no standards for judging 
the propriety of the agency’s action.” See Vartanian v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 99-1404, 2000 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 6327, at *2–*3, *6 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 6, 2000) (per curiam). 
 147. 938 F.2d 1249 (11th Cir. 1991). The plaintiff alleged that the government was under a 
statutory duty to assign the rights stemming from a patent covering an invention to which SRI’s 
employees had contributed under a federal grant.  
 148. Id. at 1254. 
 149. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C.S. §§ 200–11 (2004). 
 150. 938 F.2d at 1254 n.10. 35 U.S.C. § 202 et seq. were introduced in the Patents Act 
(Title 35) by the Bayh-Dole Act. 
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complied with. In Gen-Probe Inc. v. Center for Neurologic Study,151 
the District Court for the Southern District of California held that 
section 202 provides for no private right of action.152 The court added 
that, unlike sections 281 and 141–45 of the Patent Act, section 202 
contains no mechanism for private enforcement.153 
Moreover, the transfer of title does not occur automatically where 
the contractor failed to disclose the invention to the Federal agency or 
to the USPTO office. In Jewish Hospital of St. Louis v. Idexx 
Laboratories,154 the District Court of Maine construed section 202 in 
the following manner: 
[n]either the statute nor the regulation results in the automatic 
transfer of title IDEXX asserts. The statute requires funding 
agreements to provide that the Government ‘may receive title’ 
under certain circumstances . . . . Rather than automatically 
transferring title to the invention upon late disclosure, the 
 151. 853 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D. Cal. 1993). 
 152. Id. at 1217 (citing with approval Platz v. Sloan-Kettering Inst., 787 F. Supp. 360 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992)). 
 153.  
This conclusion [that under section 202 no private right of action exists] is supported 
by the fact that elsewhere in the patent statutes, Congress did explicitly grant private 
causes of action. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1988) (“a patentee shall have remedy by 
civil action for infringement of his patent”); 35 U.S.C. §§ 141–145 (1988) (applicant 
whose patent is rejected by the Patent Office on appeal may pursue his claim in the 
federal courts). The fact that elsewhere in the patent statutes private rights were 
expressly provided indicates that “when Congress wished to provide a private damage 
remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly.” Likewise, that such a right was 
not created under § 202(c)(7)(B) suggests that no right was intended. 
Id. at 1218 (citation omitted). This is debatable, however. True inventors are entitled to claim 
and enforce in courts inventorship and ownership of the patent, and yet the Patent Statute 
contains no provision explicitly recognizing such a right. That right stems from the principle 
that patents should be granted for those whom the law qualifies as the rightful patent letter 
addressees.  
 154. 973 F. Supp. 24 (D. Me. 1997). Idexx had moved to file a third amended answer and 
counterclaim to assert three affirmative defenses to patent infringement: (1) lack of standing or 
failure to join an indispensable party (the Federal government); (2) patent misuse and unclean 
hands; and (3) inequitable conduct. Order on Idexx’s Motion to File Third Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim (Docket Item 202) 1, Jewish Hosp. v. Idexx Labs., 973 F. Supp. 24 (D. Me. 
1997) (Civ. No. 95-290-P-H) [hereinafter Order]. The argument of Idexx was that, because 
Jewish Hospital had neglected to promptly communicate to the NIH the making of the patented 
invention under a NIH funding agreement (the communication was made after the patent was 
issued), the government had automatically acquired title and therefore the Jewish Hospital had 
no standing for enforcing rights in that patent. 
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Secretary has provided in regulation 401.14(d)(1) that grant 
recipients like Jewish Hospital retain title to the invention 
unless and until the Federal agency meets two requirements. 
First, the Federal agency must make a “written request.” 37 
C.F.R. §401.14(d). Second, the Federal agency must make this 
request “within 60 days after learning of the failure of the 
[grant recipient] to disclose.” 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(d)(1.)155 
The result that title does not transfer automatically to the 
Government under section 202 is even clearer when its language is 
compared to the language of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy 
Research and Development Act (FNERDA). “Unlike the permissive 
and conditional language of the statute and regulation here [section 
202 and 401.14], FNERDA clearly provides that ‘title to any 
invention made or conceived under a FNERDA contract shall vest in 
the United States.’”156  
Disputes involving title to the invention between the Federal 
agency and the funded inventor may not benefit third parties. The 
court said: 
Simply put, I fail to see how the allegations of improper delay, 
even if true, are at all material to this patent infringement case. 
These allegations concern the Jewish Hospital-NIH funding 
contract and its procurement. But whether Jewish Hospital 
mislead the NIH has no bearing on any legitimate issues in 
IDEXX’s answer or counterclaims. IDEXX cannot benefit 
from potential disputes between Jewish Hospital and the NIH 
arising under the contract and procurement process.157 
 155. Order, supra note 154, at 4. The court noted: “Indeed, the very title of regulation 
401.14(d) is ‘Conditions When the Government May Obtain Title.’ 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(d).” 
 156. Id. at 4 n.3 (citation omitted). 
 157. Id. at 5. These aspects of Chapter 18 represent a departure from pre-existing law. In a 
case involving the alleged infringement of a patented invention made under a 1974 grant from 
the Public Health Service (invention which was communicated to the funding agency nearly 
eighteen years after the grant expired), VDI Technologies, Inc. v. Price, Civil No. 90-341-M, 
Order of August 31, 1994 (D.N.H. 1994), the District Court of New Hampshire said that 
“[w]hile the regulations and reporting requirements did not automatically vest title to grant-
related inventions in the United States, they did automatically vest in the government the 
exclusive right to determine who could obtain and exercise ownership rights and on what 
terms.” Id. at 8. “For purposes of the present declaratory judgment action, Sudbury’s ownership 
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Actually, if it is not possible to identify here a case of inequitable 
conduct, because the funding contract is not material to the issue of 
patentability, the failure to timely disclose the invention to the 
government and to society at large (through the notice on the patent 
letter) may raise a question of unclean hands—which apparently the 
district judge’s order failed to address. The question is that the notice 
on the patent informs the public that the government—and, 
consequently, tax-payers—has interests in the patented invention, 
which may include the royalty-free use of the invention by the 
government itself, or, if some circumstances of public interest arise, 
march-in rights claims.158 Even though it seems that the government, 
and the NIH in particular, will be parsimonious in resorting to the 
extreme solution of marching in private patent rights,159 the 
possibility exists nonetheless. Failure to communicate to the USPTO 
that ownership of a certain invention made under federal funding is 
limited by Federal statutes and regulations may be seen as a serious 
omission of facts relevant to public policy; therefore, any attempt to 
enforce rights thus acquired might be deemed abusive.  
of the ‘854’ patent is not established, rendering the purported case and controversy between 
these parties unripe, at least as to the patent related claims.” Id. at 9. “Moreover, what Sudbury 
knew, or should have known, of the reporting requirements would be critical to an assessment 
of whether Sudbury was guilty of inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office 
(‘PTO’). If Sudbury did know of the restrictions on patentability and deliberately withheld that 
information, then the ‘854’ patent would most probably be unenforceable.” Id. at 10 (citation 
omitted). “At this juncture, until the government exercises its right to determine ownership of 
the invention, and, the scope of those ownership rights are determined if they are awarded to 
Sudbury, the regulations operate to preclude its claim to record ownership of the patent and 
preclude its current claim of infringement.” Id. at 11.  
 158. 35 U.S.C. § 206 (2000). 
 159. See Determination In the Case of Petition of Cell Pro, National Institutes of Health, 
Office of the Director, of August 1, 1997, available at www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug97/ 
nihb_01.htm. The Director said that the NIH is 
wary . . . of forced attempts to influence the marketplace for the benefit of a single 
company, particularly when such actions may have far-reaching repercussions on 
many companies’ and investors’ future willingness to invest in federally funded 
medical technologies. . . . In exercising its authorities under the Bayh-Dole Act, NIH is 
mindful of the broader public health implications of a march-in proceeding, including 
the potential loss of new health care products yet to be developed from federally 
funded research. 
Id. at 8. 
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On its face, the U.S. requirement is substantially distinct from the 
Requirement because it does not establish a condition of 
patentability. In other words, the Patent Office will neither reject a 
patent application because the applicant failed to inform about the 
fact that the claimed invention was made under a Federal grant, nor 
will a court invalidate or refuse to enforce patent rights on that 
ground. However, that is not the point, because, as seen above, the 
Requirement is not always imposed as a condition of patentability. 
Furthermore, even when it is not a formal condition of patentability, 
the Requirement is in violation of those WIPO treaties that deal with 
formal requirements (which are not necessarily patentability 
conditions), such as the PCT and the PLT. Therefore, even if it is not 
a formal condition of patentability, the U.S. requirement could be in 
violation of the United States’ international obligations under the 
PCT and the PLT. But it is not. The government funding disclosure 
requirement helps the funding agency and tax payers to assess 
matters of attribution of rights in the invention, i.e., ownership. Patent 
laws in general designate inventors as the original owners of patented 
inventions. But ownership may as well stem from contractual 
arrangements between inventors and their employers160 or funding 
providers. 
Worried that entities benefiting from federal grants were not 
adequately reporting inventions made in compliance with a statutory 
mandate,161 two federal agencies have already inspected the levels of 
actual implementation of 35 U.S.C. § 202. The first report was 
elaborated by the Office of Inspector General of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, in 1994. It specifically checked the 
reported disclosure of inventions made under NIH grants at the 
Scripps Research Institute and concluded that they were 
underreported.162 The Inspector General recommended a review of 
patents obtained by NIH grantees (to the argument that such a review 
would cause too much work, the Inspector suggested that the NIH 
 160. See U.S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933). 
 161. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(b)(3) (2000). 
 162. See DEP’T OF HEALTH HUM. SERVS., Underreporting Federal Involvement in New 
Technologies Developed at the Scripps Research Institute (June 1994), available at 
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/phs/c9300029.pdf. 
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take a “risk-based approach that would ensure that those grantees 
most likely to have inventions and file for patents are reviewed”).163 
The second report was issued by the United States General 
Accounting Office (GAO), in August 1999.164 This second Report 
also concluded that there was not enough information on patent 
documents on government interests in inventions made under federal 
grants. Based on that conclusion, the GAO recommended Congress 
to consider amending the Bayh-Dole Act “to standardize, improve, 
and streamline the reporting process for inventions subject to both the 
Act and Executive Order 12591.”165 In order to achieve that, the 
GAO recommended: 
[t]he Congress could consider (1) requiring the Secretary of 
Commerce to develop standardized disclosure forms and 
utilization reports for federally funded inventions, (2) making 
the patent the primary control mechanism for reporting and 
documenting the government’s rights and the only written 
instrument for confirming the government’s royalty-free 
license, and (3) requiring the Patent and Trademark Office to 
provide information to the funding agencies to assist them in 
monitoring compliance.166 
GAO’s argument was that the 
patent database is a better source than the Government 
Register for determining the government’s rights to federally 
sponsored inventions. It is more accessible than the 
Government Register in that the official patent records are 
available for inspection and a user can obtain from PTO’s 
Internet Web site the full text of patents issued since 1976.167  
Among the measures aiming to streamline the reporting process, 
the GAO had suggested a requirement that the notice on the patent 
application include “the name of each specific agency that funded 
 163. Id. at 9–10. 
 164. U.S. G.A.O. OFFICE, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERALLY SPONSORED 
INVENTIONS NEED REVISION (1999). 
 165. Id. at 19. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 14–15. 
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research, the contract or grant number(s) under which the invention 
was created, and a provision stipulating that the government has a 
nonexclusive, paid-up, royalty-free right to the use of the 
invention.”168 The GAO also proposed that the USPTO should keep 
the funding agency informed of events that might affect the 
government’s rights during the application’s prosecution (so that the 
funding agency could take preventive measures to protect its interests 
in the invention) and that the Patent Gazette include a notice on the 
government’s interest on patents issued.169 The GAO also proposed 
that the USPTO could charge applicants a fee for applications that 
contained a government interest notice.170 
The USPTO agreed that the requirement, if adopted in GAO’s 
terms, would be in compliance with the draft of the Patent Law 
Treaty that was then being negotiated. What the USPTO did not 
agree with was the increased burden on patent applicants.171 
The GAO’s recommendations were not implemented and thus the 
USPTO has no obligation to seek information on the nature or origin 
of the funds used by inventors for making claimed inventions. 
Interestingly, many of the proposals made by the GAO could have 
been subscribed to by environmental agencies of biodiversity-rich 
countries seeking ways and means to monitor compliance with 
contracts on access to genetic resources (likewise, the GAO was 
seeking a practical means to monitor, through patent documents, 
compliance with contracts of access to government funds). To the 
allegation that using the patent system to monitor the use of genetic 
resources is not efficient because it would not cover inventions kept 
undisclosed, the GAO would answer that that is not a problem 
because section 202 actually requires a patent to be filed. Therefore, 
in principle, all inventions made with government funding that are 
patentable subject matter will find their way to the USPTO. But that 
is not the issue, of course. The issue is that it would be wrong 
(however not offensive to international legislation) to use patents to 
verify whether contractors have complied with their contractual 
 168. Id. at 32. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 20. 
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obligations. The idea that patents are not certificates of good behavior 
does not apply to bioprospecting only, it also applies to government 
funding.  
Anyway, the government funding disclosure requirement is 
consistent with the obligations of the United States under the four 
international agreements mentioned above. 
First, it is compatible with the TRIPS Agreement, and not only 
because it is not a formal condition of patentability. Actually, if the 
US requirement were a (formal) condition of patentability, it would 
be nonetheless compatible with Article 62 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
And the reason was given above: it is indeed reasonable to impose 
any conditions necessary to identify the right to ownership of the 
invention. In contrast with the Requirement, as explained, under 
which suppliers of genetic resources or of associated TK do not have 
a claim of inventorship, the funding Federal agency may indeed 
claim property rights in the invention, in the event that the contractor 
fails to do so within the established period. Moreover, there are 
public interests involved in the notice concerning public funding 
because, in view of the public nature of the funding, march-in rights 
may be invoked by the government as per interested third parties’ 
request. The notice on the patent, therefore, operates as a notice to 
society at large that the rights deriving from that particular patent are 
subject to some considerations and actions that may be dictated by 
public policy.172 In contrast, the Requirement has the single purpose 
of informing stakeholders of an eventual interest in the results of the 
research or of the commercial exploitation of the claimed invention—
results to which the patent does not contribute. If the claimed 
invention consists of a cloned animal cell line, for example, the 
 172. As the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services 
said: “[w]hen the Government is not aware of a grantee’s invention, it is not able to exercise its 
rights and to protect the taxpayers’ interest.” See DEP’T OF HEALTH HUM. SERVS., supra note 
160, at 7. The GAO also took note of the rationale set out by Federal Regulations: 
It is important that the Government and the contractor know and exercise their rights 
in inventions conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the course of or under 
Government contracts in order to ensure their expeditions available to the public and to 
enable the Government, the contractor, and the public to avoid unnecessary payment 
of royalties and to defend themselves against claims and suits for patent infringement. 
48 C.F.R. § 27.305-1(a) (2004). 
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original material of which was the product of bioprospection, the fact 
that the Patent Office may be informed of the circumstances in which 
the raw material was obtained will have no consequences at all if in 
the country in question cloning technology may not be commercially 
exploited (in many countries it cannot be patented either). 
The UPOV Convention is not affected by the U.S. requirement, 
which applies to patents only (including, eventually, plant patents). 
However, if the U.S. requirement were applicable to plant variety 
protection, again, unlike the Requirement, it would be UPOV 1991 
consistent. The reason is that Article 1 of UPOV 1991 defines 
“breeder” as 
 —the person who bred, or discovered and developed, a 
variety, 
 —the person who is the employer of the aforementioned 
person or who has commissioned the latter’s work, where the 
laws of the relevant Contracting Party so provide, or 
 —the successor in title of the first or second 
aforementioned person, as the case may be.173 
As a supplier of financial resources to the breeder, the Federal 
agency would acquire title, if the U.S. Plant Variety Act so 
established, provided the breeder failed to claim the right or disclose 
the origin of the funding, as a commissioner of the breeder’s work. 
And since the basic obligation of the Contracting Parties to the 
UPOV Convention is to “grant and protect breeders’ rights,”174 it 
follows that Congress may impose an obligation on the precise 
identification of the breeder (including its employers and 
commissioners) within the application for a variety certificate. 
The U.S. requirement is not only compatible with PCT provisions, 
but it is also expressly permitted by the Treaty.175 Actually, among 
 173. UPOV 1991, supra note 44, art. 1. 
 174. Id. art. 2. 
 175. Actually, the United States government itself may have thought, at some point, that 
the U.S. requirement could be in conflict with the PCT because it has proposed to add a new 
subparagraph to Rule 51bis.1 of the PCT Regulations (on “Certain National Requirements 
Allowed”) as follows: “where the invention was invented as part of the work performed under a 
contract with the government of the designated State, any document containing a statement 
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the formal requirements the PCT refers to, there is a mention of the 
identification of “the name and other data concerning the inventor 
where the national law of at least one of the designated States 
requires that these indications be furnished at the time of filing a 
national application.”176 The U.S. requirement, which applies to 
United States patent applications only,177 concerns the identification 
of the inventor—concept which comprises the funding Federal 
agency which, under the circumstances established in Chapter 18, 
may acquire the rights which originally belong to the inventor, thus 
becoming “the inventor” for all legal purposes. 
Because the U.S. requirement has the purpose of clarifying issues 
of ownership, and because ownership is crucial to the patent system, 
the U.S. requirement is consistent with PLT provisions (which, as 
explained, incorporates the conditions of patentability established by 
the PCT) and with the draft SPLT provisions (which permits 
Contracting Parties to define the conditions under which third parties 
may succeed the inventor in his/her rights in the invention).178 
which indicates any government license rights in the invention and identifies the government 
contract.” See Proposed Amendments of the PCT Regulations and Modifications of the PCT 
Administrative Instructions, Relating to the Draft Patent Law Treaty, at 12, WIPO Doc. 
PCT/A/28/2 (Jan. 28, 2000), Annex I. Later the U.S. Delegation withdrew this proposal, 
in light of having undertaken a review of the controlling statutory provision. That 
review revealed that the controlling statutory provision only imposed an obligation on 
a contractor-applicant to include in the application a statement as referred to in 
proposed (vi); it did not provide any authority for the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office to require such statement. 
See Report, ¶ 11, WIPO Doc. PCT/A/28/5 (Mar. 17, 2000). Actually, the U.S. delegation was 
correct in concluding that there was no need for the proposed amendment, but the real reason, 
as explained above, is not that the USPTO has no authority to verify compliance with the 
statutory requirement. Actually, the PCT is not about the authority of patent offices to impose 
formal requirements: it is indeed about the possibility of Contracting Parties to impose those 
requirements, either through statutes or patent offices’ administrative practices. If the PTO 
argument prevailed, countries could establish the Requirement as a condition of validity of 
patents, provided patent offices did not have the task of verifying compliance (which would be 
left to courts). To this extent, the U.S. requirement may indeed be scrutinized in the light of the 
PCT. But the reason is different: actually, the PCT allows for the U.S. requirement because it 
relates to the identification of third parties’ ownership interests in the claimed invention. 
 176. PCT, supra note 8, art. 4. 
 177. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(6) (2000). 
 178. PCT, supra note 8, art. 4.2. 
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In conclusion, the U.S. requirement not only makes good sense in 
view of the public policy considerations that buttress it, but it is also 
entirely consistent with U.S. international obligations. 
E. Another Possible Solution Under Current National and 
International Patent Law: Material Contributions to the Inventive 
Activity May Generate Material Interests in the Patent 
Several developing countries have shown reluctance to adopt a 
disclosure requirement that is less than a condition of patentability—
even though, as we have seen, it may be inconsistent with several 
international agreements, including the TRIPS Agreement. The 
reason is one of efficiency, for illegal bioprospecting might not be 
deterred unless a stronger remedy is available. The question, then, is 
whether it is possible to impose the Requirement as a significant and 
effective measure—that is, with an impact at least as strong as if it 
were a condition of patentability—without infringing current 
international patent law (and without the need for amending the 
TRIPS Agreement, which, anyway, seems a very unlikely exercise in 
the short or medium term). The answer is yes, provided some 
fundamental aspects are taken into consideration. 
Under the national law of some WTO Members, when an 
employee who has not been hired to invent makes an invention using 
resources (including raw materials) and data that belong to his/her 
employer, the latter is entitled to a material claim in the invention, 
and, consequently, in the patent. In the United States, such claim 
means the royalty-free right of using the invention.179 In Brazil, the 
employer is entitled to ownership of half of the proprietary patent 
rights (that is, the employer becomes a co-owner) and to a paid, 
exclusive license of the other half.180 In France, the employer may 
claim full ownership of the invention or an exclusive license.181 In all 
cases, the employer’s claim stems from its material contribution to 
 179. See Mark B. Baker & Andre J. Brunel, Restructuring the Judicial Evaluation of 
Employed Inventors’ Rights, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 399 (1991). 
 180. See Brazilian Law No. 9279 of May 14, 1996, art. 91. 
 181. CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE, art. L611-7, ¶ 2. The French Intellectual 
Property Code is available (in a searchable form), at http://legifrance.gouv.fr (last visited Jan. 4, 
2005). 
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the final inventive result, and not from an inventive contribution. As 
the district court held in Synbiotics,182 there is an essential difference 
between material contributions and inventive contributions. The latter 
leads to a share in the invention as co-inventorship, which was not 
the case at bar in Synbiotics. Nevertheless, material contributions 
may lead to a share in the patent, as compensation for the value of the 
contribution. This is an issue of civil law that is well settled in Civil 
Codes, under the term “right of specification”183 or “right of 
accession.”184 The general rule is that when a new material is 
obtained from the application of an intellectual contribution to a raw 
material in a manner that transforms it, the new material belongs to 
the person who made the modification. But when the raw material (or 
the original material) is acquired in bad faith, the property in the 
resulting material goes to the owner of the raw material. A general 
exception occurs when the value of the labor (or the intellectual 
contribution) is disproportionately higher than the value of the raw 
material—in this case the property right belongs to the person who 
made the modification, but the owner of the raw material is in any 
event entitled to compensation. Examples of labor that are assumed 
as having a disproportionately high value are painting, sculpture and 
writing (for example, the Brazilian and the Spanish Civil Codes) and 
 182. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 183. See, e.g., Civil Code of Brazil, Law No. 10.406, of January 10, 2002, arts. 1269–71. In 
Brazil, the right of specification is different from the right of accession in the sense that the 
latter does not apply to chattels. Other than that difference in terminology, Brazilian law 
follows the general principles adopted in European continental countries. The text of the new 
Brazilian Civil Code is available at http://www.planalto.gov.br. 
 184. See, e.g., Civil Code of France, as amended, arts. 565–74, available at 
http://legifrance.gouv.fr. The parallel of “right of accession” in common law is conversion. See 
supra note 107 and accompanying text. In Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 
(Cal. 1990), the acquisition of rights in the invention through conversion was rejected because 
of the difference of nature between the act of supplying raw material and the act of inventing. 
See supra note 107 and accompanying text. Indeed, nothing justifies converting the act of 
supplying raw materials (even if accompanied with information based on observation) into an 
act of inventing. The right of accession is based on a different rationale—the rationale that, 
since it is impossible for the unauthorized user of the raw material to reduce it back to its 
natural state, compensation for the loss of property in the raw materials is paid in the form of 
attribution of property rights in the invention. Neither the provisions on employees’ inventions 
nor the Civil Codes attempt to substitute invention for supply of raw materials—to this extent, 
that rationale is the same rationale that the Supreme Court of California used in Moore. 
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artisanship (French Civil Code).185 Of course, the law can stipulate 
otherwise, as in the case of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law 
(which assigns to the employer half of ownership of the patent, 
regardless of the value of both the materials used by the employee 
and the final value of the invention). The invention’s final value has 
an impact only on the compensation to be paid for the exclusive 
license. Anyway, the controlling concept is intention. Was the 
bioprospector acting in good or bad faith? When national law 
contains rules on access to genetic resources, and the bioprospector 
willingly fails to notify the competent authorities of some collection 
made, bad faith may be presumed. 
Likewise, national law can stipulate that where genetic resources 
have been incorporated into inventive outputs, the country that has 
provided the resources, and in the absence of a contract establishing 
otherwise (such as a contract of access to genetic resources), the 
invention is deemed to belong (partly or totally) to the national 
authority in charge of managing biodiversity resources. The rationale 
underlying such a provision would not be different from the rationale 
that underlies those provisions on employees’ inventions mentioned 
above—or, for that matter, the provisions on the U.S. disclosure 
requirement concerning financial contributions by federal authorities. 
Eventually, the person who, or entity which, by law, acquires a 
material interest in the invention (and, consequently, in the resulting 
patent rights), is entitled to renounce his/her rights and, consequently, 
seek the rejection of the claim or the invalidation of the patent 
granted. The point here is not one of opposing a patent application on 
grounds of failure to comply with a formal requirement: it is indeed a 
matter of abandoning a claim of proprietary rights and letting the 
subject matter of the claim fall into the public domain. 
Would resorting to the doctrine of specification or of accession, 
under civil law, either in order to transfer title in inventions 
developed from genetic resources (and associated TK), or to seek the 
rejection of patent claims or the invalidation of patents, be acceptable 
 185. See Civil Code of Brazil, art. 1270, § 2; French Civil Code, arts. 570–71, as amended 
by Law No. 60-464, of May 17, 1960; Spanish Civil Code, art. 377. The complete text of the 
Spanish Civil Code is available at http://todoelderecho.com/SeccionInternacional/ 
codigosjuridicos2.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2005). 
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under the TRIPS Agreement? The answer can only be yes, on three 
grounds. 
First, the issue now being considered is not one of implementing 
the CBD—which, as explained above, is outside the scope of the 
TRIPS Agreement—but one of affirming proprietary rights in the 
output of the inventive use of genetic resources. As explained above, 
international treaties, implicitly or explicitly, do permit (if they do not 
require) the national laws to clarify proprietary interests in 
inventions. To some extent, that is not only a matter of tolerance, but 
also a crucial issue that speaks to legal security and predictability. 
Second, the TRIPS Agreement does not stand in the way of WTO 
Members’ rights of addressing proprietary interests of suppliers of 
material contributions and assessing their importance so as to 
evaluate the final stake of those suppliers in the final inventive 
output. Of course, no one could say that the U.S., the Brazilian, and 
the French provisions that give employers a material interest in 
inventions made by employees not hired to invent are TRIPS-
inconsistent. Nor, for that matter, could one say that the rules on 
specification or accession of the Brazilian and French Civil Codes are 
TRIPS-inconsistent. Attributing proprietary rights or interests in the 
result of inventive uses of genetic resources is a matter of national 
law, and the TRIPS Agreement does not establish that only inventors 
are entitled to the patents. As explained before, the TRIPS Agreement 
is not about protecting inventors, but about protecting investors. Like 
the U.S. government, which contributes with financial resources, and 
employers, who contribute with materials and data (including raw 
materials), governments that contribute with genetic resources may 
have assigned to them by law proprietary interests in the inventions. 
Obviously, the matter here is not contribution of the plants or 
animals or micro-organisms to the inventive output, but contribution 
of the genetic and biological information contained therein. It is that 
information that has been transformed or assimilated by the inventive 
contribution of the inventor. In this sense, given the unique value of 
such information, one should not take lightly that the economic value 
of genetic resources is minimal as compared to the final value of the 
invention—particularly when the invention does nothing else other 
than identifying pre-existing valuable properties or uses of the 
genetic resources. 
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Third, even where the contributor of genetic resources retains the 
right to oppose the grant of the patent or to obtain its invalidation, 
and thus the proprietary interest generates an issue of patentability as 
a supplementary aspect of the assignment of title, that is a reasonable 
formal requirement in the light of Article 62.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement to the extent it stems from proprietary interests in the 
invention. Several national laws, indeed, contain provisions making it 
possible to invalidate a patent when the applicant had no just title to 
claim property rights.186 The Requirement, under this new approach, 
is not different.187 
 186. Several countries, in their responses to the WIPO questionnaire on the Requirement, 
have noted that aspect. See Draft Study, supra note 16, ¶¶ 70–71. If a country acquires, under 
this approach, a proprietary interest in the patent, would it be interested in promoting its 
invalidation? Probably not, in general. Actually, it may be the case under certain exceptional 
circumstances, such as when the patent claims properties of genetic resources and/or associated 
TK that present particular cultural or religious relevance to traditional communities. In that 
case, the government may prefer to let the invention fall into the public domain. 
 187. As noted above, both the UPOV Convention (in both versions) and the PCT would 
accept new requirements established on grounds of proprietary interests. That issue in the 
context of the PCT has been thus scrutinized by the WIPO Secretariat: 
The PCT does not have a mechanism for a distinct declaration concerning source of 
GR/TK as a separate element of the form or content of an international application, or 
as an additional national requirement relating to the form or content of an international 
application. The PCT stipulates that it is not “intended to be construed as prescribing 
anything that would limit the freedom of each Contracting State to prescribe such 
substantive conditions of patentability as it desires.” This clearly applies to 
patentability of the invention as such. However, as has been noted several times above, 
the entitlement of the applicant to apply for and be granted a patent is also a matter of 
substantive law, distinct from the technical patentability of the invention as such, but 
potentially at least as important in terms of the ultimate ownership and exercise of the 
patent. 
WIPO Doc. WO/GA/30/7/Add.1, ¶ 179. Of course, the provisions on the entitlement to apply 
for a patent cannot be found in article 27 of the PCT, because they are formal requirements (as 
explained above, they do not concern the invention itself). The provision in the PCT that allows 
countries to take measures concerning the identification of those who are entitled to apply for a 
patent (either because they are the inventors or because they are contractual or legal assignees 
of the right to apply for the patent) is article 9 (“The Applicant”). The result, nevertheless, is the 
same: the PCT does not stand in the way of national laws establishing the Requirement as a 
manner of identifying the person or entity legally entitled to apply for a patent on an invention 
directly or indirectly derived from genetic resources (or, for that matter, an invention funded 
with governmental resources). As far as the UPOV 1991 Convention is concerned, the 
permission for Contracting Parties to impose requirements concerning proprietary interests 
arises from the third indent of small roman (iv) of article 1 (on “Definitions”), which refers to 
the successor in title of the breeder or his/her employer. It is a matter for national law, therefore, 
to establish the conditions and terms under which succession in title occurs. 
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It goes without saying that, even where the Requirement is 
adopted as a condition of patentability in the context of the attribution 
of proprietary interests, its inconvenience may be the same as 
adopting it as a means of monitoring CBD compliance. The reason is 
that a shift in the purpose and the scope of the Requirement does not 
eliminate the complexity of proving use of a legitimately accessed 
genetic resource. The fact that the Requirement, if adopted as a 
means of establishing proprietary interests in patents and plant 
variety certificates, may be TRIPS-compliant, does not eliminate the 
problems of legal insecurity and unpredictability to which it gives 
rise. 
V. A WORD OF CAUTION: THE LIMITED VALUE OF THE 
REQUIREMENT 
It is not certain that the costs generated by the implementation of 
the Requirement correspond to the benefits society is able to extract 
therefrom.188 Actually, not all costs arising from the implementation 
of the CBD can be internalized by society if they are not kept at a 
reasonable level.189 On the one hand, when biosquatting is the result 
of the claim of private property rights in knowledge that is in the 
public domain (as in the turmeric patent) in foreign countries (which 
may have legislation that is more open to patentability in the 
biotechnology field), the losers of unwarranted claims are not the TK 
holders, but the granting countries’ society at large. As a matter of 
law, TK in the public domain can be used by anyone for free. The 
misappropriation of TK permits biosquatters to put a higher price on 
 188. To my best knowledge, the Requirement has never been applied in practice, that is, no 
patent application has been rejected and no patent has been invalidated because of failure to 
comply with the Requirement. However, where the Requirement is a condition of validity of 
patent rights, a situation of legal insecurity stems from its imposition because it may be alleged 
by third parties or the patent office ex officio at any time after the grant. Legal insecurity 
increases transaction costs and thus reduces the aggregated value of the output of enforcing and 
using patent rights. 
 189. See Rick Cannell, Biodiversity’s Incalculable Value, FIN. TIMES, at 14 (July 21, 
1998): 
Bioprospecting is not always quite as immediately lucrative as some have been led to 
believe and nations (such as the Philippines) that are imposing strict costs and 
conditions on those who wish to carry out bioprospecting may be rendering their 
biodiversity too expensive to be of any use. 
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products and services that otherwise would be sold for less. 
Moreover, unduly patented traditional knowledge cannot be 
incorporated into products and services of squatters’ competitors, 
thus blocking the development of competing derivatives. But 
squatting of traditional knowledge does not prevent its holders to 
continue using it in their daily life. When the preparation of 
traditional knowledge databases has no other purpose than opposing 
patent and trademark claims, and considering the high costs that such 
preparation entails, it may well represent a waste of resources. On the 
other hand, when biosquatters claim property rights in traditional 
knowledge which remains under the private control of indigenous 
peoples and traditional communities, the enactment of measures of 
positive protection, such as a sui generis regime, may be much more 
effective tools to correct and repress situations of misappropriation. 
In that event, traditional knowledge holders will be in a position of 
enforcing their rights—rights which are recognized, if not formalized, 
by law. Enforcement of intellectual property rights may not be a very 
simple and cost-free issue, but it is always more effective than 
challenging the validity of patents based on traditions (which are 
frequently undocumented) and customary law. 
Moreover, an undue burden imposed on patent applications may 
create serious difficulties to the management of national and 
international patent systems and deviate the focus of the whole patent 
system from contributing to the progress of useful arts to the 
acknowledgement of third parties’ stakes in claimed inventions. The 
transaction costs arising from uncertainties as to ownership of 
traditional knowledge, in the absence of an international system of its 
registration, would be enormous.190  
 190. This same point was noted by the representative of a group of users in the Working 
Group on Reform of the PCT: 
One representative of users stated that an essential feature of any national law 
requiring proof of having obtained prior informed consent would be a centralized 
procedure for showing that the requirement had been met. Without this, an alleged 
failure to obtain permission for use would become a standard attack in any country 
with such a provision. An applicant may have received consent from one source, but 
be attacked on the grounds that he should have sought permission from a different 
source. The consequence would be that fewer patent applications would be filed in 
these countries, resulting in there being no benefits for the applicant to share at all. 
Even if such systems were set up in countries with this type of legislation, it was 
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VI. CONCLUSION: PATENTS ARE CERTIFICATES OF INVENTIVE 
BEHAVIOR, NOT GOOD BEHAVIOR 
This Article has shown that the requirement to disclose the origin 
of genetic resources and prior informed consent in patent 
applications, as a formal condition of patentability aimed at 
monitoring compliance with the CBD, is not consistent with 
international obligations, in particular the TRIPS Agreement and the 
CBD itself. Because the debate on its adoption at the international 
level has led to the blockage of negotiations that might lead to 
increasing security in international patent protection, it has become a 
matter of urgency to identify mechanisms that permit biodiversity-
rich countries to adopt the Requirement without infringing their 
international obligations, which could give rise to trade-related 
tensions, and yet keep the resulting encumbrances on patent 
procurement procedures at a reasonable level. 
The Article has explained that a possible solution may lie in 
linking the granting of patents on inventions directly or indirectly 
derived from genetic resources with proprietary interests in the raw 
materials supplied—the so-called “right of accession” of civil law. 
That solution has two parallels in patent law: one is the possibility of 
employers to claim proprietary interests in the inventive output of 
employees (not hired to invent) where the latter have used data and 
materials that belong to the former; the other is the legal mechanism 
that ensures material interests of the U.S. government in inventions 
made with federal funding. The U.S. government is not necessarily 
entitled to property rights in the inventions in question, but it is 
nevertheless entitled to non-paid use and third parties may request 
compulsory licenses of those inventions. Under some special 
circumstances—both claims are, if not proprietary claims, at least 
material claims in property rights. 
pointed out that this would not help the case of inventions where the information was 
gained from a different country. 
See Summary of the Session, WIPO Doc. PCT/R/WG/5/13 (Nov. 21, 2003), ¶ 140; Cynthia M. 
Ho, Disclosure of Origin and Prior Informed Consent for Applications of Intellectual Property 
Rights Based on Genetic Resources: A Technical Study of Implementation Issues, Final report, 
July 2003, study commissioned by the Secretariat of the CBD, and distributed in document 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/2/INF/2 of September 29, 2003 (available on the CBD website). 
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Nevertheless, establishing the Requirement as a material claim by 
governments of countries from the territory of which genetic 
resources have been subtracted without permission is an issue of civil 
law, which does not change the essential thrust of the patent system: 
to attribute property rights in inventions (no matter who the owner 
is). The Requirement thus can be introduced so as to identify who 
that owner is—so that the patent is granted to whom the law indicates 
is the legitimate owner.191 
Notwithstanding its eventual compliance with international 
obligations, the Requirement, if adopted as a condition of 
patentability, undermines the value of patents as effective means of 
securing property rights in inventions. The possibility of attacking the 
validity of those rights because of factors concerning conditions that 
are intrinsic to raw materials used, and extrinsic to the invention itself 
or to inventorship, would create unpredictability. Patents would lose 
much of their accuracy as reliable tools for measuring the invention’s 
value, in particular in the biotechnology field, as their validity could 
depend on elements that have nothing to do with the invention. As 
said above, patents are certificates of inventive behavior, and is in 
that capacity that they perform their social function. If transformed 
into certificates of good behavior, patents cease being patents as such 
and become certificates of the origin of genetic materials. 
Incidentally, the validity of patents could also be scrutinized vis-à-vis 
the acquisition of other raw materials and research tools, and their 
purpose of securing intangible assets would necessarily become 
meaningless. Moreover, the Requirement, if established as a 
condition of patentability, does not promote benefit sharing: it simply 
generates information about the use of genetic resources and 
associated TK in the making of claimed inventions. Most patents fail 
to generate any economic revenue, particularly in the pharmaceutical 
industry, where patent applications are filed very early in the research 
process, and patent applicants are far away from obtaining a positive 
 191. As explained above, in a very limited number of cases, governments (in principle 
eventually entitled to succeed a biosquatter in title) may prefer to invalidate the patents where 
the public outrage against some practices of biosquatting disallows maintaining them, even if 
the title is transferred to the rightful owners. Likewise, patent laws of several countries allow 
for the invalidation of patents when they are not granted to those legally entitled to apply, such 
as the true, first inventor. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
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commercial outcome. Thus, as a monitoring tool, the Requirement 
would give TK holders information about the existence of a patented 
invention only. It would not inform them about the commercial 
exploitation of that invention, let alone the financial gains of the 
patent owner. Moreover, one should not underestimate the difficulties 
of patent applicants in identifying the origin of genetic resources, the 
properties of which might have found their way into a claimed 
invention. The Requirement might prove impossible to meet in many 
instances, and therefore, it would only add to the already existing 
complexities of the patent system. 
Patents are the recognition of an inventive activity, and not of the 
manner in which that activity has been pursued. So, if an inventor has 
access to a genetic resource in a way that contradicts the legislation 
and the national policy of a given country, sanctions may be imposed 
upon the inventor. But the new and useful result of his mental activity 
of inventing, although resulting from the use of that genetic resource, 
should nonetheless entitle him to the patent. To this extent, it can be 
said that patents are certificates of inventive behavior; patents are not 
certificates of good behavior.192 For this reason, patents should not be 
used to assess the legitimacy of access to genetic resources or the 
fairness of the treatment of traditional knowledge holders by 
bioprospectors. That is not the function of the patent system. 
 192. The representative of the United States said in the TRIPS Council that 
with regard to the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, he said 
that the agreements could be implemented in a mutually supportive manner and that no 
conflict existed between them. Although he supported the objectives of the CBD, he 
did not favour using the patent system as a means to seek compliance with the CBD’s 
provisions on prior-informed consent and benefit-sharing. It was the view of the 
United States that national systems outside patent laws were the most effective way to 
achieve these objectives. These regimes could have many components, including the 
use of permits, contractual obligations, and civil and/or criminal penalties. Patent laws 
were simply not intended, nor were they appropriate, to regulate misconduct, as they 
provided exclusive rights for a limited time in exchange for disclosures in order to 
further innovation. Misconduct, such as misappropriation of genetic resources, 
required direct regulations with enforcement by criminal or civil penalties. 
See Council Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights—Minutes of Meeting—Held 
in Centre William Rappard on 18 November 2003, ¶ 19, WTO Doc. IP/C/M/42 (Feb. 4, 2004), 
¶ 109. The United States expressed the same view in the WIPO Working Group on the PCT 
Reform, Summary of the Session, ¶ 95, WIPO Doc. PCT/R/WG/6/12 (May 7, 2004). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/6
